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LAW IS THE MERE CONTINUATION OF POLITICS BY
DIFFERENT MEANS: AMERICAN JUDICIAL
SELECTION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY*
Herbert M. Kritzer**
INTRODUCTION
In March 2006, the New York Times reported that a man in Afghan-
istan was facing a death sentence for the crime of apostasy-con-
verting from Islam to Christianity.' The United States Secretary of
State reportedly called the President of Afghanistan to urge a
"favorable resolution. '2 Meanwhile, the Afghani judge expressed his
intention to maintain his judicial independence and resist interference
with the resolution of the case. 3 As Americans, we would be appalled
that anyone would face a death sentence for a personal decision about
religion. But how do we feel about a judge exercising independent
judgment under the law in such a case? Don't we want judges to exer-
cise their independent judgment in interpreting and applying the law?
The answer to this question is yes and no. We want judges to exer-
cise their independent judgment, so long as they are not too indepen-
dent. We also want judges to be accountable to the public. We value
judicial independence, just not too much of it. We want judges to
"call'em like they see'em," provided that "they don't see'em too dif-
ferently from the way we see'em." We are fundamentally conflicted
* While Carl von Clausewitz's famous quote, "War is a mere continuation of policy by other
means," typically translates the German word politik as "politics," politik can also be translated
as "policy." The translation of On War that I have actually translates the word as "policy," but it
proceeds to discuss war as a "political instrument." CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 119
(Anatol Rapoport ed., 1968) (1832).
** Professor of Political Science and Law, University of Wisconsin-Madison. B.A.,
Haverford College; Ph.D., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. I would like to thank
Sarah Binder, Forrest Maltzman, and Melinda Gann Hall for sharing unpublished data they
collected with me. I would also like to thank Cheryl O'Connor at the University of Wisconsin
Law Library, Sonya Huesman at the William Mitchell College of Law Library, staff at the Wash-
ington, Texas, and Ohio Secretary of State offices, and Richard Brisbin, Jessica Clayton, and
Nathaniel Kritzer for their assistance in assembling much of the data used in this paper. Some of
the election data employed in this Article were provided by the Interuniversity Consortium for
Political and Social Research.
1. Andrea Elliott, In Kabul, a Test for Shariah, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2006, § 4, at 3.
2. Id.
3. Id.
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about the role of law in politics and the role of politics in law, and that
is evident in our ambivalence toward the way we choose and retain
judges. 4
In fact, Americans are not alone in this struggle. As the role of
courts has increased around the world,5 country after country has be-
gun to face what Professor Alan Paterson succinctly described as a
"conundrum of the apparently insoluble tension between judicial in-
dependence and judicial accountability."' 6 While other countries have
come to see judicial selection as raising important political issues, this
is by no means a new issue in the United States. Methods of judicial
selection have changed over time to reflect the prevailing political
fashion. 7 For example, with the rise of Jacksonian democracy, there
were shifts from executive appointments to partisan elections. With
the rise of progressivism, the shifts were toward nonpartisan elections.
Recently, we have seen shifts toward a hybrid system that combines
executive appointments with retention elections in which voters are
asked whether the incumbent should be "retained in office."8
The issue of how we select judges has once again become a topic of
discussion at both the federal and state level. Has the selection of
judges become too political? Have interest groups corrupted the pro-
cess of selecting the men and women who staff our courts? What is it
that citizens look for when they are asked to participate directly in the
process of selecting and retaining judges? In this Article, I present
empirical information on how judicial selection operates in the United
States and how it has evolved since World War II. I start with a brief
discussion of the selection of judges for federal courts; I then turn to a
more extended discussion of judicial selection in the states.
4. See generally Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in
Highest State Courts, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1998, at 79; Steven P. Croley, The
Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CI. L. REV. 689 (1995);
Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43 (2003); Randall T.
Shepard, Judicial Independence and the Problem of Elections: "We Have Met the Enemy and He
Is Us," 20 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 753 (2001).
5. See generally THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER (C. Neal Tate & Torbj6rn Val-
linder eds., 1995).
6. Alan Paterson, The Scottish Judicial Appointments Board: New Wine in Old Bottles?, in
APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND
THE WORLD 13, 14 (Kate Malleson & Peter H. Russell eds., 2006) (discussing the dilemma in
countries around the globe).
7. On the evolution of judicial selection methods, see Kelley Armitage, Denial Ain't Just a
River in Egypt: A Thorough Review of Judicial Elections, Merit Selection and the Role of State
Judges in Society, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 625, 628-33 (2002) and Carrington, supra note 4, at 87-99.
8. This last system, which its proponents prefer to call "merit selection," also involves a mech-
anism for screening candidates to be considered by the executive doing the appointing. The
American Judicature Society has been a key proponent of this system.
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II. JUDICIAL SELECTION
A. Federal Judges
The federal judicial selection system is specified in the Constitu-
tion,9 and has remained unchanged despite periodic calls to reconsider
issues such as life tenure.' 0 Federal judicial selection has always been
political, whether at the Supreme Court," circuit court, or district
court level.' 2 Interestingly, one of the quietest periods for the selec-
tion of United States Supreme Court Justices was the middle of the
twentieth century. Figure 1 shows the proportion of Supreme Court
nominations that were unsuccessful throughout American history
across quarter-century periods (except for the first and last period
shown, which are shorter); the last period covers only the three nomi-
nations by President George W. Bush, and should probably not weigh
heavily in any analysis. Interestingly, if lack of success is a measure of
the politicization of the process, then the peak of politicization came
not in the late twentieth century, but in the middle of the nineteenth
century.
While the rules governing federal judicial selection have been con-
stant, the mechanics of the selection process and the nature of the
politics surrounding it have changed in significant ways. At one time,
the Senate voted on judicial nominees in closed session and until the
middle of the twentieth century, judicial nominees usually did not tes-
tify before Senate committees. More importantly, the ways that inter-
est groups seek to exercise influence over judicial selection have
changed significantly with the rise of television advertising and mass
fundraising techniques. Lower federal court selection has shifted
from the politics of patronage to the politics of ideology. Professor
Nancy Scherer argues in a recent book that this change is a result of
the combination of heightened interest in judicial decisionmaking by
9. U.S. CONsT. art. I1, § 2.
10. See, e.g., REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (Roger
C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006); Judith Resnik, Judicial Selection and Democratic
Theory: Demand, Supply, and Life Tenure, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 579 (2005).
11. See generally HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY
OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON To CLINTON (rev. ed. 1999);
JOHN ANTHONY MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES (1995).
12. See generally Kermit L. Hall, The Children of the Cabins: The Lower Federal Judiciary,
Modernization, and the Political Culture, 1789-1899, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 423 (1980); Kermit L.
Hall, Social Backgrounds and Judicial Recruitment: A Nineteenth-Century Perspective on the
Lower Federal Judiciary, 29 W. POL. 0. 243 (1976).
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FIGURE 1: SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES
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interest groups and changes in party structure. 14 The former arises
from the increased role of judicial decisionmaking in day-to-day life,
due to both the assertiveness of courts in the areas of civil liberties
and civil rights and the generally increased role of government in the
regulatory state. As the role of courts has changed, the role of parties
has changed as well. Where parties were once fundamentally local,
and members of Congress depended on local party organizations for
support in obtaining and retaining office, today that role has been
taken over by interest groups, which are powerful tools for both fun-
draising and voter mobilization. Where parties once sought pa-
tronage, interest groups now seek policies.' 5
Patterns in the selection of judges for the federal courts of appeals
and the federal district courts show these impacts. Figure 2 shows the
percentage of nominees to federal district and appellate courts who
were confirmed from 1947 through 2004. A drop in the confirmation
rate began in the 1980s and sharpened in the 1990s. Figure 3, which
draws on two slightly different but overlapping time series, 16 shows
13. ABRAHAM, supra note 11.
14. NANCY SCHERER, SCORING POINTS: POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS, AND THE LOWER FEDERAL
COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS 192-96 (2005).
15. Id. at 28-46, 108-32. For other major studies of the lower federal court selection process,
see generally HAROLD W. CHASE, FEDERAL JUDGES: THE APPOINTING PROCESS (1972); SHEL-
DON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT
THROUGH REAGAN (1997); JOEL B. GROSSMAN, LAWYERS AND JUDGES: THE ABA AND THE
POLIrICS OF JUDICIAL SELECTION (1965); and NEIL D. MCFEELEY, APPOINTMENT OF JUDGES:
THE JOHNSON PRESIDENCY (1987). For a more journalistic account of federal judicial selection
circa 1970, see DONALD DALE JACKSON, JUDGES 247-76 (1974).
16. I use two time series here because neither covers the entire period.
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FIGURE 2: PERCENTAGE OF NOMINEES CONFIRMED FOR LOWER
FEDERAL COURTS
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the pace of the confirmation process slowing over time. Importantly,
the change does not simply reflect divided government, because the
pace of the confirmation does not vary consistently depending on
whether the Senate is controlled by the President's party. For exam-
ple, some of the fastest confirmations came during Richard Nixon's
presidency when Democrats controlled the Senate. That the divided
government did not appreciably affect the pace of confirmation makes
sense if confirmation politics is largely about patronage.
A standard part of the rhetoric over contemporary federal judicial
selection is that it has become politicized. Whichever party is "out" of
the selection process decries the extreme views of the persons being
nominated to the bench by the current President. This is probably
traceable to the 1968 election, when both Nixon and third-party
candidate George Wallace attacked the Supreme Court and liberal
17. See Sarah A. Binder & Forrest Maltzman, Senatorial Delay in Confirming Federal Judges,
1947-1998, 46 AM. J. POL. ScI. 190 (2002) (including unpublished data the authors used in their
analysis); Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Confirmation Wars: Ideology and the Battle for the Federal
Courts, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 871 (2005); Roger E. Hartley & Lisa M. Holmes, Increasing Senate
Scrutiny of Lower Federal Court Nominees, 80 JUDICATURE 274, 277 (1997).
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FIGURE 3: PACE OF CONFIRMATION PROCESS1 8
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judges-Nixon for criminal justice decisions 19 and Wallace for civil
rights and civil liberties decisions.20  Today, the selection of judges,
particularly Supreme Court Justices, has become a highly visible as-
pect of presidential campaigns. While some of this revolves around
controversial issues such as abortion and gay rights, it is by no means
limited to those areas. As suggested by Scherer's analysis, it is not
that selection has become more political; rather, the nature of politics
has changed, with policy concerns supplanting patronage as the pri-
mary political force. 21
18. See Binder & Maltzman, supra note 17 (referred to in Figure 3 as B-M); Goldman, supra
note 17 (referred to in Figure 3 as SG).
19. In his Republican Party Presidential Nomination Acceptance Speech, Nixon stated that
"some of our courts in their decisions have gone too far in weakening the peace forces as against
the criminal forces in this country and we must act to restore that balance." American Presi-
dency Project, Richard Nixon: Presidential Nomination Acceptance Speech, http://www.presi-
dency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25968 (last visited Jan. 27, 2007). Nixon used similar
statements in a number of contexts, including his announcement of the Supreme Court nomina-
tions of Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist. See American Presidency Project, Richard Nixon:
Address to the Nation Announcing Intention to Nominate Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and William H.
Rehnquist to Be Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, http://www.presi-
dency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=3196 (last visited Jan. 27, 2007).
20. Interestingly, while the 1964 presidential candidate Barry Goldwater appealed to South-
ern conservatives, explicit attacks on the Supreme Court were not as central to his campaign as
they were for Nixon four years later. In part, that was because Nixon was able to frame his
attacks around law and order issues rather than around the race issue that would have appealed
to white Southerners upset about the Warren Court's decisions on civil rights. Also, most of the
Warren Court's key criminal justice decisions came after the 1964 election, as did a wave of
urban riots, including one set that occurred in 1968 after the assassination of Martin Luther King
Jr.
21. See SCHERER, supra note 14, at 28-46.
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B. State Judges
Historically, the selection of state and local judges was very much a
part of the patronage process.22 Much of this reflected the influence
of political machines, because controlling the local judiciary provided
a source of patronage and protected the machine from actions by the
courts.2 3 For example, political machines used property assessments
and the enforcement of building and health codes as tools to reward
friends and punish enemies. For these tools to work effectively, ma-
chine politicians had to be confident that their actions would not be
successfully challenged in the courts. Furthermore, courts are an ex-
cellent source of jobs-as bailiffs, clerks, or court reporters-and ap-
pointments to lucrative trusteeships for supporters.24 All of these
favors came with an expectation that money would flow back to the
political machine in the form of contributions. 25 Thus, as with the fed-
eral courts, the political focus was largely on patronage rather than
policy preferences. While nonpartisan elections were a part of the
progressive movement, eliminating partisan elections was also a goal
of the reformers who sought to end the dominance of political ma-
chines in major cities and in many states.26
The selection and retention of state judges is commonly described
as relying on one of five methods:2 7 executive appointment, legislative
selection, partisan election, nonpartisan election, and merit selec-
tion.28 This simple list obscures the wide variety of specific practices
in use and it omits entirely selection by other judges and selection
through a civil service system, which is commonly used in selecting
administrative law judges.29
22. See id. By saying "historically," I do not mean to imply that patronage does not continue
to play a major role in judicial selection in some states. See Leslie Eaton, Party Politics Hold
Sway in Choice of Judges Upstate, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2003, at B1.
23. See JACKSON, supra note 15, at 186-97; MILTON L. RAKOVE, DON'T MAKE No WAVES
DON'T BACK No LOSERS: AN INSIDER'S ANALYSIS OF THE DALEY MACHINE 221-29 (1975).
24. See MARTIN TOLCHIN & SUSAN TOLCHIN. TO THE VICTOR . . . POLITICAL PATRONAGE
FROM THE CLUBHOUSE TO THE WHITE HOUSE 131-60 (1971).
25. Id. at 144-60.
26. F. Andrew Hanssen, Learning About Judicial Independence: Institutional Change in the
State Courts, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 431, 449-51 (2004).
27. For an overview of the various methods, and an analysis of some of the issues they pre-
sent, see CHARLES H. SHELDON & LINDA S. MAULE, CHOOSING JUSTICE: THE RECRUITMENT
OF STATE AND FEDERAL JUDGES (1997).
28. Id. at 21. The latter method involves nomination by a nominating commission or commit-
tee, appointment by the governor from the list provided by the nominating commission, and
then periodic retention elections where voters are asked whether the judge should continue in
office. See id. at 125-45.
29. The most comprehensive information on the methods of judicial selection in the states is
compiled by the American Judicature Society and can be found on their website. AJS, Judicial
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Some states mix and match methods in complex ways. For example,
when a judicial vacancy occurs in New Mexico, the governor fills the
vacancy from a list forwarded by a nominating commission.30 At the
next general election, a contested partisan election is held to fill the
seat for the remainder of the term;31 the incumbent appointed by the
governor is usually one of the candidates. Thereafter, the winner of
the partisan election stands in a retention election at the end of each
term. 32 Pennsylvania also has a hybrid system; open seats on the
state's courts are filled through partisan elections, with incumbents
standing in retention elections at the end of their terms.33
Selection in the States, http://www.ajs.org/js/materials.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2007). Various
methods of initial selection are used:
" Gubernatorial appointment without confirmation
* Gubernatorial appointment without confirmation using a voluntary nominating
commission
" Gubernatorial appointment subject to confirmation by the legislature
" Gubernatorial appointment subject to confirmation by an executive council or simi-
lar body
" Gubernatorial appointment without confirmation using a mandatory nominating
commission
" Legislative selection
" Partisan elections (usually with the governor filling any vacancies occurring between
elections, with or without some sort of nominating commission or committee)
" Nonpartisan elections (usually with the governor filling any vacancies occurring be-
tween elections, with or without some sort of nominating commission or committee;
in some states all candidates must run in the primary and if a candidate gets a major-
ity in the primary that candidate is deemed elected)
" Judicial appointment (usually of lower level judges or assistant judges)
" Civil service selection for administrative law judges
Methods of retention in office are equally varied:
" Service on good behavior (life tenure)
" Service on good behavior until mandatory retirement age
" Reappointment by the governor without confirmation
" Reappointment by the governor with confirmation
" Reappointment by the governor after renomination by a nominating commission (a
"retention" reappointment, for example)
" Reelection in a partisan election
" Reelection in a nonpartisan election
" Retention election (required "yes" percentage varies)
" Reelection in a nonpartisan election that becomes a retention election if the incum-
bent is not opposed
" Reelection in either a partisan election or a retention election.
Id.
30. N.M. CONST. art. VI, §§ 35-36.
31. Id.
32. Id. § 33(A).
33. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3131 (West 2004).
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C. The Challenges of Electing Judges
Most states use some kind of mass election to select or retain
judges. The United States is almost unique in its use of elections in
the judicial selection and retention process. I know of only two excep-
tions. The first is Switzerland, where judges in some smaller cantons
are directly elected; judges in larger cantons are elected by parliamen-
tary deputies.34 The second exception, surprisingly, is Japan, where
judges of the Supreme Court are required to stand for a retention
election in the first general election after their appointment and then
at the end of each ten-year term. 35 However, the structure of the elec-
tion makes rejection extremely unlikely: a majority of ballots must
show an X indicating a vote against continuing the judge in office,
while no mark-which we would think of as abstaining-is treated as
a vote for retaining the judge.36 Moreover, very few judges ever stand
for a second retention election given the mandatory retirement age of
seventy and the general practice of not appointing someone to the
Supreme Court until the person is at least sixty.37 Thus, new appoin-
tees are essentially unknown, and the likelihood of the incumbent's
defeat is virtually nonexistent. Even if a member of the Supreme
Court became associated with unpopular decisions, few judges ever
face a second election and thus are never forced to confront a dissatis-
fied public. 38
The role of elections in American judicial selection is a manifesta-
tion of the American love affair with the idea of popular elections.
We elect our judges because we want to elect our judges. In a national
survey, respondents were given two statements and asked which was
more convincing: (1) "Judges in my state should be elected to office"
or (2) "Judges in my state should be appointed to office."' 39 The sur-
vey showed that 63% found the first statement "much more convinc-
ing" and another 18% found the first statement "somewhat more
convincing. ' 40 But it is not just that we want to elect judges; we seem
34. SYBILLE BEDFORD, THE FACES OF JUSTICE: A TRAVELLER'S REPORT 240 (1961); Mirko
Rog, Switzerland, in 4 LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD: A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA 1570, 1574 (Herbert M. Kritzer ed.. 2002).
35. David M. O'Brien, The Politics of Judicial Selection and Appointments in Japan and Ten
South and Southeast Asian Countries, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER,
supra note 6, at 355, 359.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. David B. Rottman, The White Decision in the Court of Opinion: Views of Judges and the
General Public, 39 CT. REV. 16 tbl.10 at 21 (2002).
40. Id. Ironically, 80% of the respondents also believed that campaign contributions have
"some" or "a great deal" of influence on judges' decisions. Id. at 22. This apparent schizophre-
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to be unable to accept other ways of selecting important public
officials.
Several years ago, Carleton College political scientist Steven Schier
published an op-ed piece in the Minneapolis Star Tribune while he was
on leave teaching at York University in Toronto:
If you want to get a good laugh out of Canadian university stu-
dents, just show them a copy of a 2002 Minnesota general election
ballot. Last fall I taught courses on American politics at York Uni-
versity in Toronto, and no subject so interested my students as the
many singular features of our peculiar electoral system.
Consider my local 2002 Rice County ballot. It had 39 races-for
federal and state legislative offices, state constitutional offices,
county offices, school board, city offices and 18 judicial elections.
My Canadian students wondered how any voter could negotiate
those choices knowledgeably. I had to admit, voters cannot. I told
them that I voted in only 21 of the 39 races, because I had no idea
about the other 18. In 2000, the ballot gave me 26 choices and I
only voted in nine, having no knowledge about the other 17.
My students found it odd that Minnesota would ask voters to
make so many choices, when even a political science professor who
makes his living studying elections could not vote knowledgeably in
half or more of them.
Minnesota's judicial elections were a particular hoot to the
Canadians. I explained that Minnesota puts state judges up for
election but that traditionally state law had prevented candidates
from campaigning for judicial office, essentially requiring voters to
choose in ignorance. They questioned the wisdom of electing
judges, which happens nowhere in Canada, and could not see the
logic of elections without campaigns. 4 '
The singular importance of elections in American social and political
life is captured by the old epithet, "He couldn't even get elected dog
catcher!"
As it turns out, we do not elect dog catchers, but we have elected
tree wardens, drain commissioners, mosquito control boards, and in-
spectors of hides.42 The array of offices for which elections are held is
nia was also evidenced when interviewers described the "merit selection" system and respon-
dents were asked if they would support it-72% said they would strongly or somewhat support
such a system. Id. at 23.
41. Steven E. Schier, The Minnesota Ballot Is a Joke in Canada, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB.,
Dec. 22, 2002, at 4AA.
42. When I was residing in Houston, Texas, in the 1970s, a man filed papers to run for Inspec-
tor of Hides in Harris County, where Houston is located. No one had run for this office in living
memory, and it was unlikely that more than a few people in the county were aware the office-
unfilled for decades-even existed. The candidate announced his platform: he intended to in-
spect as many hides as he possibly could, particularly female hides! In fact, he ran for office in
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astounding. 43 Many of these offices are associated with taxing author-
ity,44 and the principle of "no taxation without representation" contin-
ues to be strong. Nonetheless, the likelihood that voters can make
meaningful choices in most elections is slim. Voters simply do not
have the necessary information, and only in rare cases will they seek
out that information.45 Voters want to have a say, when they want to
have a say, but most of the time, for most minor offices, they have no
idea how to have a say unless there is some clear cue they can use to
make a choice.
The problem of cues might be less important if there were fewer
demands on voters. In most other democratic countries, voters are
expected to make a limited set of choices. In the United Kingdom, for
example, citizens generally elect only four or five officials: Member of
Parliament, Member of European Parliament, county council, local
council, and, in Greater London, mayor.46 In Canada, voters choose
members of the national parliament, the provincial parliament, local
council, and school board trustee. Moreover, as Schier described it,
"citizens of most constitutional democracies [ ] think of politics as a
team sport," where "[t]he teams are political parties, and it is the vot-
ers' job to decide which party should direct the government. '47
Political scientists have established that the most important cue for
voters is political party affiliation.4 8 Party labels are signals, albeit im-
perfect ones, and voters rely heavily on them.49 In the absence of
large part because he felt it should be abolished, and it was abolished in Harris County soon
thereafter; however, the office of Inspector of Hides does still exist in some Texas counties.
43. Other examples of officials we have elected include cemetery commissioner, park board
(Minnesota), land commissioner (Texas), university board of regents, reclamation (Nebraska),
county surveyor, bridge authority, prothonotary, library board, and fence inspector and hog
reeve (elected at town meetings in New Hampshire, at least until the 1980s).
44. These offices include sewage district commissioners, bridge authorities, and mosquito con-
trol boards.
45. See generally Nicholas P. Lovrich, Jr. & Charles H. Sheldon, Voters in Contested, Nonparti-
san Judicial Elections: A Responsible Electorate or a Problematic Public?. 36 W. POL. Q. 241
(1983).
46. In recent years, voters in Scotland also chose a member of the Scottish Parliament, voters
in Wales chose a member of the Welsh Assembly, and voters in Northern Ireland chose a mem-
ber of the Northern Ireland Assembly.
47. Schier, supra note 41.
48. See, e.g., ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER (1960); V.0. KEY, JR., THE
RESPONSIBLE ELECTORATE: RATIONALITY IN PRESIDENTIAL VOTING 1936-1960 (1966).
49. One study suggests that party labels may be the only cue that consistently affects voters in
judicial elections, either in terms of turnout or in terms of vote choice. See David Klein &
Lawrence Baum, Ballot Information and Voting Decisions in Judicial Elections, 54 POL. RES. Q.
709 (2001).
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party labels, voters look for other signals.50 While the ideal citizen
might be expected to research candidates running for office, such citi-
zens are few and far between. Schier was confronted with a ballot
involving thirty-nine elections,51 only twenty-six of which were con-
tested. Assume that for five, most voters could make a quick decision.
How much time would it take a conscientious voter to research and
reach a decision on the other twenty-one? Assuming ten minutes per
contest, this would require three and a half hours. This also assumes
that the voter knows before entering the voting booth who will be on
the ballot, which is unlikely.
What kind of cues is a voter likely to rely on, particularly one who
has little knowledge of what will actually be on the ballot? Some
states allow candidates to include information on the ballot that can
serve as a cue. Such information might be an indication of incum-
bency, a profession (for example, "Esq." for a lawyer), or a very short
phrase that the candidate hopes will attract voters.
Other than party affiliation, the most common cue is name recogni-
tion. The single largest name recognition advantage comes through
incumbency; voters will have heard of an officeholder and have a
vague memory of that name. Seeing the name on the ballot activates
that memory, and unless the voter has some negative association with
the memory or always votes to "throw the bums out," the voter will
likely back the recognized name.52 There are many other ways that
name recognition can be activated. In his seminal study of politics in
the one-party American South during the first half of the twentieth
century, Professor V.O. Key coined the phrase "friends and neigh-
bors" voting to reflect the idea that candidates running in what
amounted to nonpartisan elections-such as Democratic primaries-
drew most heavily in their county of residence and surrounding coun-
ties.53  Presumably, this effect was a manifestation of name
recognition.
50. See Mary L. Volcansek, An Exploration of the Judicial Election Process, 34 W. POL. Q.
572, 573-75 (1981).
51. Schier, supra note 41.
52. One recent study of state supreme court elections found that "high quality challengers,"
defined as those with previous service as a judge at some level of the court system, did better
than challengers lacking such experience. See Melinda Gann Hall & Chris W. Bonneau, Does
Quality Matter? Challengers in State Supreme Court Elections, 50 AM. J. POL. Sci. 20, 29-30
(2006). 1 suspect that this difference primarily reflected name recognition that challengers had
achieved through their prior experience.
53. V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS 37-41 (1949). At least one study has applied the idea
of friends and neighbors politics to judicial elections. See Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall,
Friends and Neighbors Voting in Judicial Retention Elections: A Research Note Comparing Trial
and Appellate Court Elections, 42 W. POL. 0. 587 (1989). The idea was also used in a study of
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The power of name recognition is most evident when it is wrong. In
1990, Chief Justice Keith Callow ran for reelection to the Washington
Supreme Court.54 An unknown local lawyer, believing that no elec-
tion should go uncontested, entered the contest. Much to everyone's
surprise, the challenger won. How did this happen? First, Washing-
ton has a nonpartisan system for electing members of the state su-
preme court. All candidates must run in the primary, even if there are
only two candidates. If a candidate gets a majority in the primary, he
or she is deemed the winner and need not run in the general election.
This means that all two-candidate elections are resolved in the Sep-
tember primary, when the turnout is lower and the electorate is less
engaged than in the November general election. Justice Callow lost in
the primary. Second, the unknown lawyer who defeated Justice Cal-
low was named Charles W. Johnson. At the time there were three
relatively well-known Charles Johnsons in the state: "[A] Tacoma tel-
evision anchor, a former sergeant-at-arms of the State Senate and a
Superior Court judge. '55 Presumably, many voters mistook Charles
W. Johnson for one of these other Charles Johnsons.
A dramatic example of name confusion came in a 1976 election for
the Texas Supreme Court.56 At that time, Texas was still a one-party
Democratic state as far as the courts were concerned. 57 This meant
that the real election for the supreme court came in the Democratic
primary. The 1976 primary was somewhat unusual because it was for
an open seat; no incumbent was running in the election. 58 Charles
Barrow's candidacy was backed by the Democratic Party establish-
ment; he was a well-regarded court of civil appeals judge from San
Antonio. 59
However, an unknown Houston lawyer named Don Yarbrough
danced into the election. Yarbrough had made an election bid the
prior year, but that was the limit of his political experience. 60 Yar-
brough stunned the Texas establishment by winning the primary with
judicial elections in Ohio. See Kathleen L. Barber, Ohio Judicial Elections-Nonpartisan Prem-
ises with Partisan Results, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 762, 779-80 (1971).
54. Robb London, For Want of Recognition, Chief Justice Is Ousted, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28,
1990, at B16.
55. Id.
56. Paul Holder, That's Yarbrough-Spelled with One "0": A Study of Judicial Misbehavior
in Texas, in PRACTICING TEXAS POLITICS 447 (Eugene W. Jones et at. eds., 4th ed. 1980).
57. Id. at 451.
58. Id. at 450. The vacancy arose because the man appointed to the seat the prior year, who
had previously served as a trial judge, announced that he would retire. Id. He was eligible to
retire, and his retirement pension would be based on the higher supreme court salary. Id.
59. Id.
60. Holder, supra note 56, at 450.
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60% of the vote.61 The explanation was voter confusion. Don Yar-
borough (note the two "o's") had sought the governor's office three
times in the 1960s, and Ralph Yarborough represented Texas in the
U.S. Senate for many years.
This being Texas, the story is not over. After Yarbrough donned
the judicial robes, he asked the people of Texas for their prayers and
announced that God had told him to run for the Texas Supreme
Court.62 This statement prompted a political cartoon showing a cari-
cature of Yarbrough (Figure 4). In the wake of Yarbrough's election
to the supreme court, it came out that there were disbarment proceed-
ings pending against him for allegedly committing a host of ethics vio-
lations. During his early months on the court, the number of charges
mushroomed. 63 More importantly, in May and June of 1977, Yar-
brough was caught on tape plotting to kill a former business associate
and making a variety of incriminating statements. 64 On July 15, Yar-
brough resigned.65 Yarbrough was subsequently tried and convicted
on perjury charges and sentenced to prison. He appealed unsuccess-
fully to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, and when it was time for
him to begin his sentence, he failed to appear and refused to return to
the United States from the island of Grenada, where he had gone with
the court's permission to study medicine. Finally, in 1983, while at-
tending classes on St. Vincent, a country with which the United States
has an extradition treaty, Yarbrough was arrested, flown immediately
to St. Thomas, and then back to Texas. 66 In July 1983, Yarbrough was
sentenced to seven years for bail-jumping, a sentence which ran con-
currently with his shorter sentence for perjury.
Name recognition not resulting from mistake or confusion can also
work to a candidate's advantage. For example, open-seat elections for
the Minnesota Supreme Court are extremely rare; there have been
only three such elections in the last sixty years.67 The most recent was
61. Id. at 450-51.
62. Yarbrough spoke to reporters: "It got to the point where it was so plain and so clear it was
like-it wasn't a normal voice-but the longer it went, the plainer it got, and it got down to 'You
run for the Supreme Court."' Id. at 450.
63. Under Texas law, disbarment would not have disqualified Yarbrough from serving on the
state supreme court. Id. at 452.
64. Id. at 448.
65. The Governor of Texas promptly announced that he would appoint Charles Barrow, the
man Yarbrough defeated in the primary, to the now-vacant seat on the Texas Supreme Court.
Id. at 452.
66. Texas Fugitive Hustled from Virgin Islands, M[AMI HERALD, Mar. 19, 1983, at 8D.
67. Not only are open-seat elections in Minnesota rare, but incumbent losses are essentially
unheard of. With the exception of one justice who was appointed a few months before the
election, the last time an incumbent member of the Minnesota Supreme Court was defeated in a
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FIGURE 4: THAT'S YARBROUGH-SPELLED WITH ONE 0
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in 1992, when Alan Page defeated Kevin Johnson for a vacant seat on
the Minnesota Supreme Court. 68 At the time of the election, Johnson
reelection bid was over 100 years ago in 1900. Sally Kenney, Meaning, Emotions, and Symbols:
Mobilizing for Women Judges 8 (2003) (unpublished manuscript presented at the 2003 Annual
Meeting of the Law & Society Ass'n in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania) (on file with author). Thus,
only one Minnesota Supreme Court justice has been defeated since Minnesota adopted nonpar-
tisan elections in 1912. This is not to say that sitting justices have not been subject to significant
challenges. For example, in 1978, incumbent Justice C. Donald Peterson was challenged by a gay
rights activist in the wake of a court ruling that refused to recognize same-sex marriage. Id. at
16. In 1996, Justices Edward Stringer and Paul Anderson were challenged by opponents who
were endorsed by a state right-to-life organization. See Philip Kronebusch, Minnesota Courts:
Basic Structures, Processes, and Policies 28 (undated, unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
68. The 1992 open-seat election occurred in spite of an effort to prevent it from happening.
The governor attempted to extend the incumbent's term for two years, at the incumbent's re-
quest, so he would be able to retire at age seventy on a full retirement pension. Kronebusch,
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was an assistant county attorney who had previously challenged the
younger Hubert Humphrey (also known as Skip Humphrey) for state
attorney general, and Page was serving as an assistant attorney gen-
eral. Page walked away with the election with 62% of the vote.69 One
explanation for Page's success is that he was well known in Minnesota
as a former star defensive player on the Minnesota Vikings in the
1960s and 1970s. In fact, about four years before running for the Min-
nesota Supreme Court, he was inducted into the Pro Football Hall of
Fame.70 It also probably did not hurt Page that he was known by
many to be a Democrat, while his opponent Kevin Johnson was
known to be a Republican; in 1992, Democrats ran strongly in the
state level elections in Minnesota, with Bill Clinton at the head of a
ticket garnering 58% of the two-party vote.71
While the examples of Charles Johnson, Don Yarbrough, and Alan
Page dramatically demonstrate how a recognized name can work to a
candidate's advantage, 72 names can also work to a candidate's disad-
vantage. In June 2006, the legal community in Los Angeles was sur-
prised by the defeat of a highly regarded veteran of the California
Superior Court. Judge Dzintra Janavs, who had served for twenty
years, lost to Lynn Diane Olson. Olson had practiced law for four
years from 1988 to 1992 before leaving practice to open a bagel shop
with her husband; it was not until 2005 that she even reactivated her
bar membership.73 Janavs was rated "exceptionally well qualified" by
supra note 67, at 30. Page filed suit challenging the governor's action. Id. When the case got to
the Minnesota Supreme Court, all seven justices recused themselves, and a special ad hoc su-
preme court, consisting of seven retired judges, heard the case and returned a decision striking
down the governor's action. Id. The election went forward, and it was too late for the incum-
bent to file as a candidate; Alan Page won the election. Id.
69. THE MINNESOTA LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 1993-1994, at 358-59 (1993).
70. Pro Football Hall of Fame, Alan Page, http://www.profootballhof.com/hof/member.jsp?
playerjid=171 (last visited Jan. 27, 2007).
71. For the three candidate vote, Clinton received 44% of the vote with Bush getting 32% and
Perot 24%. President Elect: 1992, http://www.presidentelect.org/e1992.html#state (last visited
Jan. 27, 2007).
72. Name recognition does not necessarily help. The only other open-seat election for the
Minnesota Supreme Court since 1946 occurred in 1966, when Justice Thomas Patrick Gallagher
ran for the seat being vacated by his father, Thomas Francis Gallagher, who had won the previ-
ous open-seat election in 1946. Foley v. Donovan, 144 N.W.2d 600, 602 (Minn. 1966). Moreover,
Gallagher was a name long associated with the Minnesota Supreme Court as Frank T. Gallagher
had served on the court from 1947 to 1963 and Henry Gallagher had been Chief Justice from
1937 to 1944. Minnesota State Law Library Docket Series: Chronological List of Justices and
Judges of the Minnesota Appellate Courts, http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/judges.html (last
visited Jan. 27, 2007). Nonetheless, Thomas Patrick Gallagher lost the 1966 election to Donald
Peterson, a former Republican state legislator. Id.
73. Megan Garvey & Jessica Garrison, Judge's Loss Stuns Experts, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 2006,
at B1.
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the Los Angeles Bar Association-one of only two judicial candidates
on the ballot with that rating-and was listed on the ballot as "judge
of the Superior Court" (California permits ballot labels). 74 Olson was
rated "not qualified" and was listed on the ballot as "attorney at law."
The interpretation of the outcome was that Judge Janavs was hurt by
her foreign-sounding name. It probably did not help that Olson out-
spent her by a substantial margin. Further, while California trial court
elections are nonpartisan, Janavs was known as a Republican in some
quarters and this may have hurt her among some voters. In fact, Ol-
son claimed that her decision to challenge Janavs and not one of the
other sitting judges was "because of her political affiliation" and her
"reputation for courtroom gruffness. ' 75
Although these are all interesting anecdotes, is there evidence that
name recognition has more than an anecdotal impact? It does, as I
will show below, and it relates to the problem of information and what
we expect of voters.
D. Participation in Judicial Elections
One way to see that voters have difficulty with judicial elections is
by examining voter participation in those elections. Turnout for elec-
tions in the United States is generally low, particularly outside the
surge years of presidential elections. 76 Few people would expect a
large turnout for an election if the only races on the ballot were judi-
cial, whether state or local. Unsurprisingly, the level of turnout for
judicial elections depends on what else is on the ballot. It also de-
pends on whether the judicial election is a partisan, nonpartisan, or
retention. election. One study of state supreme court elections from
1948 through 1974 dramatically illustrated these effects.77 As shown
in Figure 5, turnout declines sharply as one goes from presidential to
mid-term to off-year or off-season elections, and as one goes from
partisan to nonpartisan to retention elections.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See generally Angus Campbell, Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change, 24 PuB.
OPINION Q. 397 (1960). For a discussion of the low level of turnout in the United States, see G.
Bingham Powell, Jr., American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective, 80 AM. POL. Sci. REV.
17 (1986).
77. PHILIP L. DuBois, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST FOR
ACCOUNTABILITY (1980) [hereinafter DuBois, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH]; Philip L. Dubois,
Voter Turnout in State Judicial Elections: An Analysis of the Tail on the Electoral Kite, 41 J. POL.
865 (1979) [hereinafter Dubois, Voter Turnout in State Judicial Elections].
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More importantly, even those voters who do come to the polls often
skip over the judicial elections-a phenomenon known as "roll-off. '' 79
Figure 6 shows the roll-off percentages for the same period. A recent
study provides another look at the roll-off question for the period
from 1980 to 1994, with the averages for partisan, nonpartisan, and
retention at 21%, 27%, and 30%, respectively.80 These figures are
higher for partisan elections and lower for nonpartisan and retention
elections than those for the earlier period. However, this difference
probably reflects in significant part the inclusion of uncontested parti-
san and nonpartisan elections in the more recent data, but not in the
earlier study.
78. DuBois, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH, supra note 77, tbl.1 at 46.
79. Dubois, Voter Turnout in State Judicial Elections, supra note 77, at 872.
80. See Melinda Gann Hall, Mobilizing Voters in State Supreme Court Elections: Competi-
tion and Other Contextual Forces as Democratic Incentives 35 (May 19-20, 2006) (unpublished
manuscript presented at the Sixth Annual State Politics and Policy Conference, Texas Tech Uni-
versity), http://www.depts.ttu.edu/politicalscience/2006conference/2006conference-program.htm
[hereinafter Hall, Mobilizing Voters]. Note that because of the information reported in the pa-
per, my computations omit states that either changed selection method or use a combination of
types of elections.
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FIGURE 6: ROLL-OFF IN STATE SUPREME COURT
ELECTIONS, 1948-197481
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E. Competition in Judicial Elections
Many commentators have criticized the increased participation of
interest groups in judicial elections, particularly in state supreme court
elections.8 2 Whether such participation is positive or negative de-
pends on your view of democratic politics. The primary way in which
interest groups have influenced judicial elections is through campaign
expenditures, either by their own direct expenditures or by donating
money to candidates. A significant portion of these expenditures is
devoted to television advertising, as shown by information compiled
by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University.8 3 The
Brennan Center reports that the number of states with supreme court
elections allowing television advertising increased from 4 in 2000 to 9
81. DUBois, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH, supra note 77, tbl.2 at 48.
82. For a sampling of this commentary, see Justice at Stake Campaign, http://www.justiceat
stake.org (last visited Jan. 27, 2007); see also Mike France & Lorraine Woellert, The Battle over
the Courts, Bus. WK., Sept. 27, 2004, at 36; William Glaberson, A Bipartisan Effort to Remove
Politics from Judicial Races, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2000, at A18; Adam Liptak, Judicial Races in
Several States Become Partisan Battlegrounds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004, at Al; My Judge Is a
Party Animal, ECONOMIST, Jan. 1, 2005, at 20.
83. Deborah Goldberg et al., The New Politics of Judicial Elections 2004: How Special Interest
Pressure on Our Courts Has Reached a "Tipping Point" -And How to Keep Our Courts Fair and
Impartial 2 (2005), available at http://faircourts.org/files/NewPoliticsReport2004.pdf; see also
Chris W. Bonneau, Patterns of Campaign Spending and Electoral Competition in State Supreme
Court Elections, 25 JUST. Sys. J. 21 (2004); Chris W. Bonneau, What Price Justice(s)? Under-
standing Campaign Spending in State Supreme Court Elections, 5 ST. POL. & POL'Y Q. 107
(2005).
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in 2002 to 15 in 2004. In 2006 television advertising was used in 10 of
the 11 states with contested supreme court elections.8 4
Competition in state supreme court elections has increased over the
last quarter century. Figure 7 shows the pattern of competition from
1980 through 2006. The likelihood that an incumbent running in a
state supreme court election will be challenged has increased 33%. In
some ways, this figure may underestimate the trend, because there has
been a shift away from partisan elections to nonpartisan elections.85
In the 1980s, the number of partisan elections for state supreme court
seats was almost equal to the number of nonpartisan elections. By
2000, over 70% of the elections were nonpartisan. 86 The percentage
of nonpartisan elections that were contested increased from 42% to
65%, while the percentage of partisan elections, which was higher to
begin with, increased from 56% to 79% in the 1990s; it has now fallen
back to 67% for the period from 2000 to 2006.87 This last point is
curious and may reflect an aberration. As shown in Figure 7, the per-
centage of contested partisan elections in 2006 was only 36%, reflect-
ing in significant part that only two of the eight incumbents running
for reelection in Texas faced challengers. Interestingly, it appears that
over the last twenty years, Texas has essentially moved from a one-
party Democratic state for purposes of elections to the state's highest
courts, to a virtually one-party Republican state, with Democrats less
and less inclined to challenge Republicans for those seats.
84. Despite Big Spending, Interest Groups Don't Run Table on Judicial Elections, EYES ON
JUSTICE: THE JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN NEWSLETTER (Nov. 22, 2006), http://justiceatstake
.org/JASnews/22Nov06.htm.
85. Bonneau and Hall found that whether the election was partisan or nonpartisan was one
factor predicting the likelihood of an incumbent state supreme court justice being challenged;
other factors that predicted challenges were whether the incumbent had been appointed to fill a
vacancy and was running for election for the first time, whether the justices were elected in
districts (rather than statewide), the general level of political competition in the state, salary,
term length, and the number of lawyers in the state. Chris W. Bonneau & Melinda Gann Hall,
Predicting Challengers in State Supreme Court Elections: Context and the Politics of Institutional
Design, 56 POL. RES. Q. 337 tbl.1 at 342 (2003).
86. Much of this reflected changes in the formerly one-party Democratic Southern states,
which effectively had nonpartisan elections because of the failure of Republicans to contest most
elections generally, and judicial elections specifically. Dubois studied state supreme court elec-
tions outside the South for the period 1948 through 1974; about 70% of the elections in his study
were nonpartisan. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH, supra note 77, tbl.3 at 50.
87. In his study of supreme court elections outside the South for the period from 1948 to 1974,
Dubois found that 87% of partisan and 49% of nonpartisan elections were contested. Id. Be-
cause he did not consider competition in primary elections, his figures may underestimate the
level of competition. When I recompute the percentages adding in contested primaries in three
nonpartisan states (Washington, Oregon, and Idaho), the percentage of nonpartisan elections
that were contested rises to 57%. This suggests that there may actually have been a dip in
competition in the late 1970s through the 1980s.
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FIGURE 7: CHALLENGERS IN STATE SUPREME COURT
ELECTIONS, 1980-200688
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While challenges to incumbents have increased over the last quarter
century, incumbents still win most races. Professor Melinda Gann
Hall found that only 41 of 307 state supreme court justices (13%) who
ran for reelection in nonpartisan or partisan systems between 1980
and 1994 were defeated.89 Based on information provided by Justice
at Stake, only 3 out of 37 incumbents (8%) were defeated from 2002
to 2004 in partisan or nonpartisan election states.90 Part of this appar-
ent decline probably reflects the shift toward nonpartisan elections.
88. Melinda Gann Hall, State Supreme Courts in American Democracy: Probing the Myths of
Judicial Reform, 95 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 315 tbl.1 at 317 (2001); updated information through
2000 provided by Professor Hall; additional updated information from Justice at Stake
Campaign, 2002 State Supreme Court Elections and Opponents, http://www.justiceatstake.org/
files/Elections&Opponents.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2007); Justice at Stake Campaign, 2004 State
Supreme Court Election Results, http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/ElectionChart2004
RESULTS.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2007); and Justice at Stake Campaign, 2006 State Supreme
Court Elections, http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/2006ElectionResults.pdf (last visited Jan. 27,
2007).
89. See Hall, Mobilizing Voters, supra note 80, tbl.1 at 35. Bonneau found that between 1990
and 2000, only 15.4% of incumbents were defeated. Chris W. Bonneau, Electoral Verdicts: In-
cumbent Defeats in State Supreme Court Elections, 33 AM. POL. RES. 818 tbl.1 at 823 (2005)
[hereinafter Bonneau, Electoral Verdicts].
90. Justice at Stake Campaign, 2002 State Supreme Court Elections and Opponents, supra
note 88; Justice at Stake Campaign, 2004 State Supreme Court Election Results, supra note 88.
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Hall found that 9% of incumbents were defeated in nonpartisan states
versus 19% in partisan states.91 Incumbents are much less likely to be
defeated in retention elections: less than 2% of incumbents were de-
feated between 1980 and 1994.92 In fact, the raw numbers show that
only 4 of the 234 state supreme court justices standing for retention
during this period were defeated, and 3 of those were in the 1986 Cali-
fornia election in which Chief Justice Rose Bird, Justice Joseph
Grodin, and Justice Cruz Reynoso were targeted for their apparent
opposition to the death penalty. 93 Two additional justices lost reten-
tion elections between 1994 and 2000: Justice Penny White in Tennes-
see and Justice David Lanphier in Nebraska, both in 1996.94 From
2001 through 2006, 68 state supreme court justices faced retention
elections; only Russell M. Nigro in Pennsylvania (2005) was not
retained.95
Leaving aside the retention elections, one might ask whether the
success of incumbents in state supreme court elections is unique? The
answer is a resounding no. Incumbents in American elections enjoy a
high degree of success. For purposes of comparison, Hall summarized
research on the success rates for incumbents running for reelection to
the United States House of Representatives, state senates, and state
assemblies. The research she found reported success rates of 94%,
90%, and 92% for incumbents of the U.S. House, state senates, and
state assemblies, respectively. 96 The incumbency advantage has been
91. Hall, Mobilizing Voters, supra note 80, tbl.1 at 35.
92. Id. tbls.1-4 at 35-38.
93. See JOSEPH R. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: REFLECTIONS OF A STATE SUPREME
COURT JUSTICE (1989); John H. Culver & John T. Wold, Rose Bird and the Politics of Judicial
Accountability in California, 70 JUDICATURE 81 (1986); Joseph R. Grodin, Judicial Elections:
The California Experience, 70 JUDICATURE 365 (1987); John T. Wold & John H. Culver, The
Defeat of the California Justices: The Campaign, the Electorate, and the Issue of Judicial Account-
ability, 70 JUDICATURE 348 (1987). The fourth state supreme court justice turned out of office
on a retention vote during this period was Wyoming Supreme Court Justice Walter Urbigkit in
1992 (my thanks to Melinda Gann Hall for providing this information). The only information I
could locate indicates that he was opposed for retention on the grounds that he was "soft on
crime." See USA TODAY, Oct. 23, 1992, at 11A.
94. Traciel V. Reid, The Politicization of Retention Elections: Lessons from the Defeat of Jus-
tices Lanphier and White, 83 JUDICATURE 68, 68 (1999).
95. Justice at Stake Campaign, 2002 State Supreme Court Elections and Opponents, supra
note 88; Justice at Stake Campaign, 2004 State Supreme Court Election Results, supra note 88;
Justice at Stake Campaign, 2006 State Supreme Court Election Results, supra note 88. Two of
the 68 elections occurred in 2005, and are not listed in the Justice at Stake reports. Only one
other state supreme court justice, Harry Arend of Alaska in 1964, has been defeated in a reten-
tion election (my thanks to Larry Aspin for this information). See Randy M. Olsen, Harry 0.
Arend: Alaska Bar Controversy Claims First Judge, http://www.alaskabar.org/INDEX.CFM?ID
=6181&makeback=true (last visited Jan. 27, 2007).
96. Hall, Mobilizing Voters, supra note 80, tbl.1 at 35.
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rising in the United States, and that is probably true for state supreme
court justices as well. Professor Philip Dubois reported that out of a
total of 529 non-Southern judicial elections between 1948 and 1974-a
fraction of which were open-seat elections and therefore no incum-
bent ran for reelection-58 state supreme court justices were defeated
for reelection. 97 This means that at least 11% of incumbents were de-
feated. Hall found that about 25% of state supreme court elections
between 1980 and 1994 were open-seat elections;98 if one assumes the
same percentage for the 1948 to 1974 period, this would indicate that
about 15% of non-Southern incumbents running for reelection in par-
tisan and nonpartisan elections were defeated in the earlier period,
which is only slightly more than what Hall found from 1980 to 1994.99
Fewer studies report results from electoral challenges to state court
judges below the supreme court level. I compiled data for Wisconsin
for the period 1998 to 2005.100 During this time, incumbents stood for
reelection 25 times for the Wisconsin Court of Appeals and 314 times
for the Wisconsin Circuit Court. Two appeals court judges were op-
posed, one of whom was defeated; 33 circuit court judges were op-
posed, with 5 being turned out of office. Thus, only about 10% of
these lower court judges were opposed in their reelection bids, and
only 4% of incumbent appeals court judges and 1.6% of trial court
judges running for reelection, were defeated. While the numbers will
vary from state to state, it would be surprising if there were sharp
differences in more than a few states.
97. DUBois, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH, supra note 77, tbl.13 at 109.
98. Hall, Mobilizing Voters, supra note 80, at 13, tbls.2-4 at 36-38. Actually, this figure may
be slightly overstated because Dubois reports some information for defeats in primaries, but
does not count in his larger study primary elections where a candidate received more than 50%
of the votes and did not then have to stand in the general election.
99. There is extensive political science literature on the growth of incumbency advantage in
legislative elections. The explanations for this growth center on districting to protect incum-
bents, and the advantages incumbents have in serving constituents. See, e.g., John R. Alford &
John R. Hibbing, Increased Incumbency Advantage in the House, 43 J. POL. 1042 (1981); John
M. Carey et al., Incumbency and the Probability of Reelection in State Legislative Elections, 62 J.
POL. 671 (2000); Gary W. Cox & Jonathan N. Katz, Why Did the Incumbency Advantage in U.S.
House Elections Grow?, 40 AM. J. POL. Sci. 478 (1996); Scott W. Desposato & John R. Petrocik,
The Variable Incumbency Advantage: New Voters, Redistricting, and the Personal Vote, 47 AM. J.
POL. ScL. 18 (2003); Keith Krehbiel & John R. Wright, The Incumbency Effect in Congressional
Elections: A Test of Two Explanations, 27 AM. J. POL. ScI. 140 (1983). Importantly, neither of
these factors should be relevant in judicial elections. Bonneau analyzed the incumbent defeats
between 1990 and 2000, and found they were most likely for an incumbent standing for election
for the first time after being appointed to fill a vacancy, in partisan elections, and in states that
chose justices in districts rather than statewide. See Bonneau, Electoral Verdicts, supra note 89,
at 833-34, 836-37.
100. 1 used this period because it was not until 1998 that the Wisconsin Blue Book indicated
whether a candidate was an incumbent.
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One scholar's studies of retention elections for all levels of courts
between 1964 and 2004 assembled information on a total of 5894 such
elections.10 1 In only 55 (0.9%) were the judges not retained in office;
in 99.1% of elections, the judges were retained. 0 2 Importantly, 29 of
the 55 elections where judges were not retained were in Illinois, which
requires a 60% vote for retention.10 3 Of the 29 judges not retained in
Illinois, 28 obtained more than a 50% "yes" vote. Thus, in less than
0.5% of retention elections was there less than a majority of voters in
favor of retaining the judge in office.1 4
With this very high retention rate, one is not going to find measura-
ble change over time. However, another question is whether the per-
centage of persons voting to retain has changed over time. In fact, as
Figure 8 shows, there is some decline in the percentage of voters cast-
ing "yes" votes in retention elections, dropping from around 84% in
the 1960s to around 70% by the 1990s; by the end of the 1990s, how-
ever, "yes" votes had gone back up to 75%, a figure that has been
stable over recent election cycles.
F. Partisan Cues in State Supreme Court Elections
Voters look for quick and easy information when they vote. Even
as they bad-mouth political parties, voters rely heavily on partisan la-
bels, even in judicial elections where partisanship would seem incon-
sistent with our ideal of an impartial judiciary. It should come as no
surprise that when party labels are included on the ballot, voters use
them in making their choices. One way to see this is to examine pat-
terns in election returns. In a study that is now almost thirty-years
old, Dubois adopted the methodology of comparing voting patterns in
judicial elections to those in state partisan elections, with a specific
101. Larry Aspin, Trends in Judicial Retention Elections, 1964-1998, 83 JUDICATURE 79, 79
(1999); Larry Aspin, Judicial Retention Election Trends: 1964-2004: Updating and Expanding
Information Previously Reported in "Trends in Judicial Retention Elections, 1964-1998," (un-
dated, unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Aspin, Judicial Retention
Election Trends: 1964-2004] (providing information from 2000 to 2004).
102. Aspin, Judicial Retention Election Trends: 1964-2004, supra note 101, at 2.
103. Id.
104. Id. Aspin notes that ten of the defeats in Illinois came in a single year. Id.
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FIGURE 8: MEAN PERCENTAGE VOTE FOR RETENTION 1964-2004105
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focus on gubernatorial elections.'0 6 Specifically, Dubois looked to see
if the pattern of support at the county level moved in similar or differ-
ent ways for gubernatorial and judicial elections. He did this by corre-
lating the percentage of the electorate voting for the Democratic
candidate in the most recent gubernatorial election to the percentage
voting for identifiably Democratic candidates in state supreme court
elections.10 7 Dubois omitted from his analysis any elections where the
two candidates did not differ in their party affiliation. 108 Because of
the period he considered, 1948 through 1974, Dubois omitted from his
analysis Southern states where the elections were effectively decided
in Democratic Party primaries. His findings were striking.
When Dubois looked at the states with partisan elections, he found
that the average correlation across the 139 elections in his data set was
0.85.109 Importantly, with the exception of one state, New Mexico, the
105. Larry Aspin, Trends in Judicial Retention Elections, 1964-1998, supra note 101; Larry
Aspin, Judicial Retention Election Trends: 1964-2004, supra note 101.
106. DuBois, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH, supra note 77, at 64-100. In fact, Dubois was not the
first to do this for judicial elections. The methodology was employed in an earlier study of Ohio
state supreme court elections. See Barber, supra note 53.
107. DuBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH, supra note 77, at 64-100.
108. Id. at 73-74.
109. Id. tbl.10 at 75. The nine partisan states Dubois examined were West Virginia, Indiana,
Pennsylvania, New York, Iowa, Colorado, Kansas, Utah, and New Mexico. Some of these states
changed selection methods during the period of Dubois's study and are included only for the
relevant years. More detailed results, including correlations for individual elections, can be
found in Dubois's University of Wisconsin doctoral dissertation. Philip L. Dubois, Judicial Elec-
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minimum correlation in the nine states Dubois analyzed was 0.64.110
Because he considered only elections where opposing candidates were
associated with different parties, Dubois looked at a subset of 62
(about 60%) of the nonpartisan elections."l ' The average correlation
he found for the nine nonpartisan states in his analysis was only 0.24,
and the range of correlations was much broader, from a low of -0.49 to
a high of 0.74.112 Finally, Dubois did a similar calculation for three
states-Ohio, Michigan, and Arizona-that used mixed systems al-
lowing parties to nominate candidates but did not list party affiliation
on the general election ballot. 113 The mean correlation for the 75
elections in these three states was 0.44, with a range as high as 0.81
and as low as -0.42.114
I have updated Dubois's analysis by assembling some contemporary
data of the type he employed. I have compiled data for nine states:
Alabama, Texas, West Virginia, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Washington,' 15
Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Ohio.116 At this time, I have not been
able to identify partisan connections for candidates in nonpartisan
states as Dubois did.' 17
tions in the States: Patterns and Consequences tbl.3 at 143-45 (1978) (unpublished Ph.D. disser-
tation, University of Wisconsin-Madison) (on file with author) [hereinafter Dubois, Judicial
Elections in the States].
110. DUBOis, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH, supra note 77, tbl.10 at 75.
111. Id.
112. Id. The nonpartisan states in the calculation above include Montana, Minnesota, Ne-
vada, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming, North Dakota, and Idaho. Dubois omitted the
one election that met his criteria in Oregon. He also did not include results from Washington,
Oregon, and Idaho where a candidate won a majority of the vote in the primary and did not have
to run in November. For a discussion of the implication of the negative correlation, see infra
notes 168-170 and accompanying text.
113. DUBois, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH, supra note 77, at 71. Ohio relies on party primaries,
while in Michigan parties nominate candidates at state conventions. Arizona, which changed to
a merit plan in the 1970s, used party primaries.
114. Id. tbl.10 at 75.
115. For Washington, I have also added data for primary elections in which a candidate gar-
nered a majority and did not have to run in the subsequent general election. Data for one
election in Washington, the 1948 primary election, could not be located by the Washington Sec-
retary of State's office; that election is omitted from the analysis.
116. 1 assembled this data from a variety of sources depending on where the authority for
overseeing elections resides in a given state. For most states this is the Secretary of State's office;
some states have a separate unit to oversee elections (e.g., in Wisconsin it is the State Elections
Board). In several cases, election tabulations were provided by state archives.
117. One other distinction in my analysis compared to Dubois's is that when a judicial election
did not fall during the year of a gubernatorial election, I averaged the results for preceding and
following elections (except for elections in 2004 because I did not have the 2006 results availa-
ble). If an election fell on an odd year so that it was not in the middle year between gubernato-
rial elections, I used a weighted average of the gubernatorial elections, counting the more recent
election more heavily than the more remote election. In all of my calculations, I focused only on
the votes for the two main parties-or two main candidates in the case of judicial elections.
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1. States Using Partisan Elections
The four partisan states I analyzed are Texas (60 elections,
1980-2006),"8 Pennsylvania (21 elections, 1946-2006),"9 West Vir-
ginia (31 elections, 1946-2006), and Alabama (28 elections,
1988-2006).120 The average correlations in the four states are 0.881
(Texas), 0.874 (Pennsylvania), 0.865 (West Virginia), and 0.877 (Ala-
bama). Across all four states the average is 0.876, which is only
slightly higher than the average Dubois reported (0.85).121
The correlations for all of these elections are shown in Figure 9. All
but four of the correlations exceed 0.7, and only one falls below 0.5;
the highest is 0.977. I have included in Figure 9 a line connecting the
averages for each even-numbered year.122 The typical correlations for
Pennsylvania and West Virginia were higher pre-1960 than for the
four states in recent years. There was something of a drop starting
around 1960, although the plunge in the early 1970s is a quirk of a
small number of elections. This line suggests that the correlation rose
during the 1990s.
The extremely low correlation is worth examining. That correlation
was 0.260, and is from an election in Alabama in 1988 for the seat of
chief justice. The election pitted sitting Justice Gorman Houston
against Sonny Hornsby. Houston had been appointed to the court in
1985 and won reelection as a Democrat in 1986 (surviving a challenge
in the Democratic primary that year, but unopposed in November).
In 1988, he ran for chief justice as a Republican, having announced his
party conversion while serving on the court, and lost to Sonny Horn-
sby, who ran as a Democrat. Voters, who only two years before had
118. In recent years, Democrats have allowed Republicans to run unopposed for the two
Texas courts of last resort; in some elections Republicans have been opposed by candidates from
the Libertarian Party. I have not included the Libertarian Party candidates in my analyses. On
the politics of judicial selection in Texas, see KYLE CHEEK & ANTHONY CHAMPAGNE, JUDICIAL
POLITICS IN TEXAS: PARTISANSHIP, MONEY, AND POLITICS IN STATE COURTS (2005); SHELDON
& MAULE, supra note 27, at 73-85; and Donald W. Jackson & James W. Riddlesperger, Jr.,
Money and Politics in Judicial Elections: The 1988 Election of the Chief Justice of the Texas
Supreme Court, 74 JUDICATURE 184 (1991).
119. Since the mid-1970s, Pennsylvania has used partisan elections only for open seats; incum-
bents stand for retention.
120. Three other states use partisan elections, at least in some way. In Illinois and Louisiana,
supreme court justices are chosen by districts, which precludes the kind of analysis I am present-
ing here. In New Mexico, after a vacancy is filled by gubernatorial appointment, the first elec-
tion is conducted as a partisan contest, with justices then standing for retention at the completion
of each term. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
121. Dubois, Judicial Elections in the States, supra note 109, tbl.3 at 144-45 (providing the
correlations for 1948 to 1974 for West Virginia and Pennsylvania).
122. 1 included the Pennsylvania elections that occurred in odd-numbered years with the pre-
vious year in computing these averages.
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FIGURE 9: PARTISAN VOTING PATTERNS IN STATES WITH PARTISAN
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, 1946-2004123
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voted for Houston as a Democrat, may not have noticed the party
label on the ballot and voted for the familiar name, whom many may
have thought was a Democrat.
2. States Using Nonpartisan Elections
What happens when we look at elections in nonpartisan states? I
have compiled data from Minnesota (1946-2006), Wisconsin
(1946-2006), and Washington (1946-2006). I have included county-
level data for every seat that was contested, not just those in which
there were clear party links to both candidates (which is what Dubois
did in his analysis). I also included primary elections in Washington in
which a candidate won 50% or more of the vote, and thus did not
have to face the voters in November. 24 I have data on a total of 129
elections in these three states. Because I have not sought to match the
123. For the period from 1948 to 1974, I used the correlations from Dubois, Judicial Elections
in the States, supra note 109, tbl.3 at 143-45. I computed the 1946 and post-1974 correlations
from data compiled from various sources, see supra note 116.
124. Because of this rule, a majority of contested judicial elections in Washington are decided
in the primary election. See Charles H. Sheldon & Nicholas P. Lovrich, Jr., Voter Knowledge,
Behavior and Attitudes in Primary and General Judicial Elections, 82 JUDICATURE 216 (1999).
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FIGURE 10: PARTISAN VOTING PATTERNS IN STATES WITH
NONPARTISAN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, 1946-2004
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candidates with a political party, I consider only the absolute value of
the correlations; I recomputed the average correlation for Dubois's
data using absolute values, and obtained an average of 0.294 across a
total of 62 elections. 125 The average over the three nonpartisan states
for which I compiled data is 0.272.
While in states with partisan elections the correlations were so high
that there was obviously a relationship, caution is warranted in consid-
ering the nonpartisan states. Specifically, even if no relationship exists
between the voting patterns in gubernatorial elections and judicial
elections, we would not expect the correlation to be exactly zero;
rather, we would expect the correlation to vary randomly around zero
(or, if we look only at absolute values, to vary randomly from zero).
The question here is whether the pattern reflects random variation
among the counties or a systematic relationship between voting pat-
terns in one election and another. We can never answer this defini-
tively, but standard statistical methods allow us to draw conclusions
about whether or not a relationship deviates from that produced by a
random process. The typical standard in statistical inference is to con-
125. See Dubois, Judicial Elections in the States, supra note 109, tbl.5 at 152-53.
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clude that an observed relationship is not reflective of a random pro-
cess if the chance of observing the statistic describing the relationship
if it were random is less than one out of twenty (0.05); the cutoff value
for the correlation depends on the number of observations (counties
in this analysis). Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Washington have sev-
enty-two, eighty-seven, and forty-one counties, respectively; 26 the rel-
evant cutoff values for correlations from each of the states are 0.232,
0.211, and 0.310.127
Figure 10 shows a scatterplot for all of these correlations.' 28 Over-
all, 47% are statistically significant (i.e., less than a one in twenty
chance of being produced by a random process); for the individual
states the corresponding figures are 40%, 35%, and 60% for Minne-
sota, Wisconsin, and Washington. There are some interesting patterns
in Figure 10, and some anomalies worth noting. First, Washington
stands out as having higher correlations than either Minnesota or Wis-
consin, and Minnesota stands out as having lower correlations, partic-
ularly in the last ten to twenty years. Second, prior to 1985, relatively
few of the correlations were above 0.4, and almost none were above
0.5. After 1985, two of the three states, Wisconsin and Washington,
show substantial numbers of elections with correlations above 0.4, and
several above 0.6, including three in Washington that exceed 0.9. This
increase in typical correlations is confirmed by the line shown in Fig-
ure 10, which plots the decade averages. Through the 1990s, the aver-
ages fluctuated between 0.164 and 0.272; for the elections starting in
2000, the average increased to 0.464. Less clear in Figure 10 is the fact
that the average in Minnesota has not increased, and is at 0.220 for the
most recent years (compared to 0.184 between 1946 and 1998). In
Washington, the increase in partisanship is particularly clear; in Min-
nesota, in contrast, it is difficult to argue that partisanship has
increased.' 29
Let us look at some of the more partisan elections in each of the
three states. In Minnesota, the most partisan election occurred back
in 1950, when the correlation was 0.602. During the period covered by
my data, there have been 72 elections for the Minnesota Supreme
Court. Incumbents have stood for reelection in 69 of those elections
126. Wisconsin had only seventy-one counties until 1970.
127. See HERBERT ARKIN & RAYMOND R. COLTON, TABLES FOR STATISTICIANS (1950).
128. I computed these correlations using data compiled from various sources, see supra note
116.
129. One might speculate that the lack of an increase in partisanship in Minnesota is somehow
related to a failed effort to inject partisanship into judicial elections in Minnesota back in the
1930s. See Malcolm C. Moos, Judicial Elections and Partisan Endorsement of Judicial Candidates
in Minnesota, 35 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 69, 71-73 (1941).
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(there have been only 3 open-seat elections in the last sixty years);
incumbents have faced an opponent in 38 elections, and only one in-
cumbent has been defeated, no doubt due in significant part to Minne-
sota's practice of indicating incumbency on the ballot. 130 In 1950,
incumbent Justice Theodore Christianson, who had been appointed to
office the previous May, faced Mark Nolan. Nolan was a former state
legislator and a Democratic activist, and Theodore Christianson bore
the name of his father, a former Republican governor of the state.
31
Voters apparently linked the two judicial candidates to the Demo-
cratic and Republican parties.' 32
Wisconsin has a strong tradition of nonpartisanship in judicial elec-
tions and in judicial selection more generally.1 33 Indicative of the non-
partisan nature of the state supreme court elections was the 1983
open-seat election in which one of the candidates was the former
Democratic majority leader in the state senate William Bablich; the
correlation between the percentage vote for Bablitch and the Demo-
cratic vote for governor the preceding November (Wisconsin's judicial
elections are held in April) was -0.167. Not until the last decade have
there been signs of partisan divide in judicial elections, with two elec-
tions producing moderately strong partisan patterns. The strongest of
these was in 2000, when Diane Sykes, who had been appointed to fill a
vacancy by longtime Republican Governor Tommy Thompson, was
130. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 204B.36 (West 1992) ("If a chief justice, associate justice, or judge is
a candidate to succeed again, the word 'incumbent' shall be printed after that judge's name as a
candidate."); see also Laura Benson, The Minnesota Judicial Selection Process: Rejecting Judicial
Elections in Favor of a Merit Plan, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 765, 769 (1993).
131. See DuBois, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH, supra note 77, at 90. Dubois incorrectly identi-
fies Justice Christianson as the former governor. For information on the governor, see Minne-
sota Historical Society, Governors of Minnesota, http://www.mnhs.org/people/governors/gov/gov
23.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2007).
132. See DuBols, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH, supra note 77, at 90. There are several elections
in Minnesota where the correlation reaches 0.44 or 0.45; in at least two of these, there were clear
partisan connections to the candidates (or at least the candidate's names). In one, an election in
1956, the incumbent had been appointed by the Democratic governor, and the challenger shared
the last name of the previous Republican governor; it is worth noting that the other judicial
election that year produced a virtually identical correlation even though there were no apparent
partisan connections to the two candidates. In 1966 in a rare open-seat election, a man who had
been an unsuccessful Democratic candidate for governor faced a man who had been a Republi-
can legislator and an unsuccessful Republican candidate for lieutenant governor. An additional
twist to this election was that the Democratic candidate was seeking to succeed his father who
had the same name; trying to ride on his father's reputation was not a winning strategy, and the
Republican candidate won, but with the smallest margin of any of the Minnesota elections in my
data set. Id.
133. See David W. Adamany, The Party Variable in Judges' Voting: Conceptual Notes and a
Case Study, 63 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 57, 69-72 (1969). For general information regarding Wiscon-
sin judicial elections, see David Adamany & Philip Dubois, Electing State Judges, 1976 Wis. L.
REV. 731.
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unsuccessfully challenged by Louis Butler, an African-American trial
court judge from Milwaukee. 134 Sykes's Republican credentials were
strengthened by the fact that she is the former wife of a popular con-
servative talk show host, newspaper columnist, and author, Charles
Sykes.1 35 The other election with a notable partisan pattern was in
1997, when another recent Thompson appointee, Jon Wilcox, was
challenged by Walt Kelly, a lawyer who received strong backing from
state labor organizations. 136 Interestingly, one of the most explicitly
partisan elections, at least in the tone of the challenger's campaign,
came in 1999, when challenger Sharren Rose attacked the record of
incumbent Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson as being too liberal. 137
While the correlation for this election, 0.463, was high by the norms of
Wisconsin history, it was not as high as either the election just before
it (Wilcox v. Kelly) or the election that came next (Sykes v. Butler).138
Jim Johnson ran twice for the Washington Supreme Court, 139 unsuc-
cessfully in 2002 against Mary Fairhust, and successfully in 2004
against Mary Becker. Both of these elections were for open seats, and
in both of them the correlation between the nonpartisan judicial elec-
tion pattern and the partisan gubernatorial election exceeded 0.9
(0.905 in 2002 and 0.906 in 2004). Johnson was a prominent lawyer
and former assistant state attorney general who was known for having
represented a number of conservative political and business interests,
134. Dennis Chaptman, Sykes Locks up a Term of Her Own, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr.
5, 2000, at Al.
135. In 2004, Justice Sykes was appointed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals by Presi-
dent George W. Bush. Butler was then appointed by Thompson's Democratic successor, Gover-
nor James Doyle, to fill the vacancy created by Sykes's departure. Katherine M. Skiba, U.S.
Senate Approves Sykes for Federal Seat, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 25, 2004, at B1.
136. Richard P. Jones, Wilcox Wins Easily; Benson Beats Cross Again: Justice Backs Spending
Limits in Future Supreme Court Elections, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 2, 1997, at 1.
137. Steve Schuttze & Richard P. Jones, Election '99: Impact of Vote on High Court Tough to
Call, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 4, 1999, at Newsl; Richard P. Jones, Election '99: Abra-
hamson Fends off Rose, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 7, 1999, at Newsl.
138. A key structural change in the Wisconsin court system that occurred after Dubois's study
was the creation of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals in 1977. But it was not until about twenty
years later that the election of justices in Wisconsin started to take on a more partisan cast. I
noted above the election of Democrat William Bablitch. A similar, negative statistic appears for
Justice Shirley Abrahamson the first time she stood for reelection in 1979 after having been
appointed to the court by Democratic Governor Patrick Lucey in 1977.
139. For a discussion of judicial elections through about 1995 in Washington, see SHELDON &
MAULE, supra note 27, at 53-68. Excellent historical background on the Washington Supreme
Court can be found in the work of the late Charles Sheldon. See CHARLES H. SHELDON, A
CENTURY OF JUDGING: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT (1988);
CHARLES H. SHELDON, THE WASHINGTON HIGH BENCH: A BIOGRAPHICAL HISTORY OF THE
STATE SUPREME COURT, 1889-1991 (1992).
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particularly in cases involving property rights. 140 Johnson received en-
dorsements from both the state Republican Party and the state Liber-
tarian Party.141 In the 2002 election, Johnson's opponent was the
senior assistant attorney general and a former president of the state
bar association, who was backed by the state Democratic Party as well
as by organized labor, environmental groups, and Indian tribes.
142
The election was a squeaker, and was not resolved until all absentee
ballots were counted; 143 in the end, Fairhurst won with 50.11% of the
vote. 144 In 2006, there was something of a replay of the 2004 election,
with an incumbent justice, Gerry Alexander, challenged by another
conservative property rights interests attorney, John Groen; Alexan-
der narrowly won the primary which produced a partisan correlation
of 0.783.145 A second race involved an incumbent, Susan Olson, who
had faced four challengers in the primary. In the general election she
faced a Republican state senator, Steve Johnson, who was also allied
with property rights interests and had been a leading proponent of the
state's Defense of Marriage Act in 1998. Olson won easily with al-
most 60% of the vote (carrying all but four of Washington's thirty-
nine counties); given Johnson's prominence as a conservative Republi-
can activist, it is not surprising that the partisan pattern was strong,
with a correlation of 0.904.146
In 2004, Johnson faced appeals court judge, and former Democratic
state legislator, Mary Kay Becker. 147 Conservative interests again
lined up behind Johnson, and liberal groups backed Becker. 148 John-
son collected a record-setting campaign war chest of over half a mil-
140. Johnson had served as an assistant state attorney general for about twenty years. See
Maureen O'Hagan, Candidate's Environmental Pitch Challenged, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 29,
2004, at B5.
141. Neil Modie, Spearman Backs Fairhurst for State High Court, SEArLE POST-INTELLI-
GENCER, Sept. 19, 2002, at B7.
142. See Angela Galloway, Builders Backing Top-Court Candidate: Johnson Campaign Got
$180,000 from Industry, but He Vows to Be Independent, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 25,
2002, at B1.
143. Girls Rule, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 24. 2002, at GI; Unoffical Results: Fed-
eral and State, SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 6, 2002, at A15.
144. Gregg Herrington, Fire District Levy Falls Five Votes Short of 60 Percent, COLUMBIAN
(Vancouver, Wash.), Nov. 21, 2002, at C1.
145. Ralph Thomas, Alexander Prevails in Bitter Court Race, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 21, 2006,
at B1.
146. Susan Kelleher, Owens Wins Another Term After Unusually Costly Race, SEATTLE TIMES,
Nov. 8, 2006, at B5.
147. Becker had served on the appeals court for ten years. See Maureen O'Hagan, Supreme
Court Races Lack Usual Mystery, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 23, 2004, at B1.
148. Ralph Thomas, Interest Groups Targeting State Supreme Court Races, SEATTLE TIMES,
May 23, 2006, at B1.
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lion dollars, surpassing the record he set two years before. 149 Johnson
won this time with 52% of the vote.1 50
What might explain the increasingly partisan pattern in Washing-
ton? One simple answer is that the supreme court makes decisions on
important issues that people and groups care greatly about. Why
should one be surprised that groups that care greatly about these is-
sues want to see justices and judges on the courts who are likely to
share their perspectives? For example, in July 2006, the Washington
Supreme Court handed down a decision upholding the state's ban on
gay marriage) 51 The controlling majority on the court found that the
gay marriage ban met rational basis scrutiny.1 52 Justice Alexander
concurred, joined by Justice Johnson, noting that the same-sex mar-
riage ban would survive strict scrutiny because there is "a compelling
governmental interest in preserving the institution of marriage."1 53
The dissenting opinion was authored by Justice Mary Fairhurst, who
had defeated Johnson in 2002.154 Furthermore, issues of natural re-
sources and development policies have long been extremely important
in Western states, and particularly so in the Northwest; 55 it should not
be surprising that groups with interests in these areas will want judges
and justices whom they see as sympathetic to their causes.
3. States Using Nonpartisan Elections but with Partisan
Nominations
Let us now turn to Michigan and Ohio, two states that employ a
mixed system of partisan nomination and nonpartisan elections. Fig-
ure 11 shows a scatterplot of correlations for the two states. The data
points for 1948 through 1974 are from Dubois; 156 I compiled and com-
149. Id.
150. Id. In the wake of the 2004 Washington state supreme court election, the Washington
Legislature extended limits on campaign contributions, which had not previously applied to judi-
cial elections. Presumably, this would preclude large contributions from groups (or individuals)
such as Cruise Specialists, who contributed $112,000 to Johnson's campaign because it was upset
with an appellate decision upholding a multimillion dollar judgment against it that had been
authored by Johnson's opponent. Id.
151. Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006); see also Adam Liptak & Timothy
Egan, A Sharply Divided Washington Supreme Court Upholds State's Ban on Same-Sex Mar-
riage, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2006, at A18.
152. Andersen, 138 P.3d at 990.
153. Id. at 1010 (Alexander, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 1012-27 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting).
155. Justice William Douglas, who was raised in the state of Washington, was long associated
with environmental causes. See WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, MUIR OF THE MOUNTAINS (1961); WIL-
LIAM 0. DOUGLAS, MY WILDERNESS: EAST TO KATAHDIN (1961); WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, MY
WILDERNESS: THE PACIFIC WEST (1960); WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, OF MEN AND MOUNTAINS
(1950); WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, A WILDERNESS BILL OF RIGHTS (1965).
156. Dubois, Judicial Elections in the States, supra note 109, tbl.4 at 150-51.
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FIGURE 11: PARTISAN VOTING PATTERNS IN STATES WITH
PARTISAN NOMINATIONS FOR NONPARTISAN JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS, 1946-2004157
-0.6 1 ...
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
1 o Ohio 0 Michigan
Note: Solid line is Ohio; broken line is Michigan
puted the relevant statistics for 1946 and for after 1974. I calculated
averages for each decade represented in the data. Through the 1990s,
these averages fluctuated between about 0.33 and 0.50, showing no
clear pattern of increase. For the current decade, however, the aver-
ages for Ohio and Michigan are 0.74 and 0.65 respectively, suggesting
that partisanship may have in fact increased in the most recent period;
this increase is shown by the lines for the decade averages for each of
the two states.
In some ways, Ohio is the more interesting of the two states because
of the strong association between some family names and the Repub-
lican Party. 158 In the 1940s, Ohio Senator Robert Taft, the oldest son
157. For the correlations from 1948 to 1974, see id. I computed the other correlations using
data compiled from various sources, see supra note 116.
158. A fair amount has been written on judicial elections in Ohio. See, e.g.. Kara Baker,
Comment, Is Justice for Sale in Ohio? An Examination of Ohio Judicial Elections and Sugges-
tions for Reform Focusing on the 2000 Race for the Ohio Supreme Court, 35 AKRON L. REV. 159
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of President and Chief Justice William Howard Taft, was known as
Mr. Republican.1 59 Robert Taft unsuccessfully sought the Republican
nomination for President in 1940, 1948, and 1952.160 His son Robert
A. Taft, Jr. was elected to the U.S. Senate, and his grandson Robert A.
Taft III was elected Governor of Ohio. A member of the Taft family,
Kingsley A. Taft, served on the Ohio Supreme Court from 1949
through 1970.161 The partisan patterns when Taft was running tended
to be high (0.63, 0.60, 0.70, and 0.55). Another Taft, Sheldon A. Taft,
ran unsuccessfully for the court in 1974, challenging incumbent Frank
Celebrezze, a well-known Democrat.162 Not surprisingly, in this latter
election, there was a strong partisan correlation (0.69).163 In fact,
when Celebrezze ran for chief justice in 1978 against his Republican
colleague on the bench, Thomas Herbert, t 64 the partisan correlation
reached 0.818, which was the highest up until that time.
A second well-known name that was once associated with the Re-
publican Party in Ohio is Brown. Ted W. Brown served as the Repub-
lican Secretary of State from 1950 to 1978.165 One of the
congressional districts in central Ohio was represented by Clarence
Brown (and then his son, Clarence Jr.) for many years; in 1982, Clar-
ence Jr. was the Republican candidate for governor. 66 Over the
years, a number of candidates named Brown have run for the Ohio
Supreme Court. Republican Paul W. Brown ran successfully in 1964,
(2001-2002); Barber, supra note 53; Lawrence Baum, Explaining the Vote in Judicial Elections:
The 1984 Ohio Supreme Court Elections, 40 W. POL. Q. 361 (1987) [hereinafter Baum, Explain-
ing the Vote]; Lawrence Baum, Voters' Information in Judicial Elections: The 1986 Contests for
the Ohio Supreme Court, 77 Ky. L.J. 645 (1988-1989); Jonathan L. Entin, Judicial Selection and
Political Culture, 30 CAP. U. L. REv. 523, 525-39 (2002); Marie Hojnacki & Lawrence Baum,
Choosing Judicial Candidates: How Voters Explain Their Decisions, 75 JUDICATURE 300 (1992);
Marie Hojnacki & Lawrence Baum, "New-Style" Judicial Campaigns and the Voters: Economic
Issues and Union Members in Ohio, 45 W. POL. Q. 921 (1992); Klein & Baum, supra note 49;
Michael E. Solimine, The False Promise of Judicial Elections in Ohio, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 559
(2002); Bradley Link, Note, Had Enough in Ohio? Time to Reform Ohio's Judicial Selection
Process, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 123 (2004).
159. See JAMES T. PATTERSON, MR. REPUBLICAN: A BIOGRAPHY OF ROBERT A. TAFT
(1972).
160. Id. at 205-22, 409-18, 547-66.
161. See The Supreme Court of Ohio, Judges and Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www
.sconet.state.oh.us/introduction/alljustices/default.asp (last visited Jan. 27, 2007).
162. See Jennifer Brunner Ohio Secretary of State, http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/Elections
Voter/results1970s.aspx? (last visited Jan. 27, 2007).
163. DUBois, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH, supra note 77, at 83.
164. Id.
165. Ted Brown Dies at 78; Ohio Secretary of State, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1984, at B10.
166. In recent years, Brown has become more closely associated with the Democratic Party,
with the chairman of the Ohio Democratic Party, Chris Redfern, remarking in 2006 that "in
Ohio, Brown's name is golden." Ian Urbina, Popular Ohio Democrat Drops out of Race, and
Perhaps Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2006, at A13.
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1966, and 1972, each time showing moderate partisan patterns (0.56,
0.63, and 0.58).167 In 1970, Democrat Allen Brown ran against Re-
publican J.J.P. Corrigan;t 68 Corrigan was a name moderately associ-
ated with the Democratic Party, in part because of its Irish origins. In
this election, there was clearly some voter confusion, because the par-
tisan pattern was reversed, with a correlation of -0.41.169 Candidates
in Ohio have attempted to take advantage of the name confusion.
One example involves Republican C. William O'Neill, who joined the
Ohio Supreme Court after serving as the Governor of Ohio. 70 In
1974, he was opposed by Democrat Joseph E. O'Neill. 171
Between 2000 and 2004, there have been nine elections to the Ohio
Supreme Court.172 As noted previously, the partisan pattern in the
election outcomes since 2000 is notably stronger than pre-2000; the
average correlation for the earlier period is 0.472, compared to 0.760
for recent years. 173 Moreover, only 4 of the 68 elections through 1998
had correlations exceeding 0.7 while 8 of the 9 recent elections had
correlations exceeding 0.7. The 2000 election between Republican
Terrence O'Donnell and Democrat Alice Resnick produced a partisan
correlation of 0.898. It seems apparent that the partisanship of elec-
tions in Ohio is becoming fairly consistent where previously it was
spotty.
The overall patterns in Michigan are similar to those in Ohio, al-
though Michigan lacks the kind of prominent political names that
seem to play a role in Ohio. 174 Thus, the correlations in Michigan
167. DuBols, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH, supra note 77, at 83. Paul W. Brown ran again in
1978, after Dubois's study was complete; in that election, he was opposed by Clifford W. Brown.
Other Browns who have run for the court over the years are Republican Don P. Brown (1976),
and Democrats William B. Brown, Lloyd 0. Brown, and Clifford F. Brown. In fact, in the
twenty year period from 1960 to 1980, twelve of the sixty candidates in contested supreme court
elections had the name "Brown." See Kathleen L. Barber, Nonpartisan Ballots and Voter Con-
fusion in Judicial Elections 30 (1982) (unpublished manuscript presented at the 1982 Annual
Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Ass'n) (on file with author).
168. DUBOis, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH, supra note 77, at 84.
169. Id.; see also Barber, supra note 53, at 779-80.
170. In 2004 and 2006, Democrat William M. O'Neill ran unsuccessfully for the court.
171. Jennifer Brunner Ohio Secretary of State, supra note 162.
172. Lawrence Baum studied voting decisions in the 1984 Ohio Supreme Court election using
a postelection survey of Ohio voters. The 1984 election had a strong partisan ring to it, with
Democratic candidates having names linked to the Democratic Party. Not surprisingly, Baum
found that voters' own partisanship played the strongest role in their voting decisions. See
Baum, Explaining the Vote, supra note 158.
173. The average for the 1990s was 0.513.
174. This is not to say that name games never get played in Michigan. There have been sev-
eral candidates named Cavanagh or Kavanagh. In 1966, Democrat Thomas M. Kavanagh was
elected to the court; he was reelected in 1974, and died in office in 1975. In 1968, Democrat
Thomas G. Kavanagh was elected to the court; in 1976 he was reelected even though the Demo-
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have not been quite as high as in Ohio. In the period prior to 2000,
the average correlation was 0.415, compared to 0.590 since 2000. Only
one election in Michigan since 2000 has had a correlation exceeding
0.7 (in Ohio, there were four such elections prior to 2000).175
Both Ohio and Michigan show evidence of increasingly partisan
voting patterns, although it is a bit more ambiguous in Michigan. In
recent years the states have had some highly contentious elections for
the state supreme court, although the increased partisan patterns do
not necessarily coincide with the contentiousness of specific elections.
4. Summary
Partisanship is important in elections. Given all that we know
about voter behavior, it should not be surprising that voters use the
information party labels provide. Importantly, we have seen increas-
ing links to partisanship in judicial elections even when party labels
are not provided. Exactly why this is the case is not necessarily clear
from the data. However, a likely partial explanation is the combina-
tion of an increase in campaign expenditures by interest groups and
the endorsement of candidates in nonpartisan elections by political
parties (at least in Washington). These developments have a greater
impact today because in recent years the parties have come to re-
present clear differences on a variety of issues, and hence provide
even better information to voters than they did through much of the
second half of the twentieth century.
One must not overstate the significance of the increased partisan-
ship described above. While the aggregate patterns show increased
partisanship, this does not necessarily translate into increased parti-
sanship in the outcomes of judicial elections. Certainly in states that
employ partisan elections, a realignment between the parties will
show up in which party dominates the state supreme court. Thus, it
comes as no surprise that the once Democratic supreme courts of Ala-
bama and Texas are today Republican. It has become extremely diffi-
cult for Democrats to win any statewide office in those states and, at
least in Texas, elections for the supreme court and the court of crimi-
cratic convention nominated someone else for the position. In 1982, Democrat Michael F.
Cavanagh was elected to the court, and was subsequently reelected in 1990 and 1998.
175. One of the challenges of doing this analysis for Michigan is that many of the elections are
for multiple seats; voters can cast as many votes as there are seats open, and the requisite num-
ber of candidates with the most votes win the seats. I have followed Dubois's approach of
matching Democratic and Republican candidates such that the candidate with the most votes
from one party is paired with the candidate with the least votes from the other party. If there
are three seats, the middle vote-getters from each party are paired. See DuBols, FROM BALLOT
TO BENCH, supra note 77, at 274 n.42.
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nal appeals are frequently uncontested by a candidate from the Dem-
ocratic Party. However, in a state such as Ohio, which has seen an
increased partisan pattern in voting in judicial elections, incumbency
remains a dominant feature, which means that in the same election
both Democratic and Republican incumbents will be reelected to the
Ohio Supreme Court. 76
III. THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL SELECTION
There is a long line of research by political scientists on the question
of whether the different selection systems we employ produce differ-
ences among the judges, either in terms of who the judges are or in
terms of the kinds of decisions judges make. Much of the evidence on
this question has been mixed, with some showing effects at the mar-
gins177 and some showing more systematic effects. 178 To a significant
degree, the weak connections typically found in past research seem
inconsistent with a number of highly visible recent elections where
candidates were perceived as representing significantly different posi-
tions on key issues.
In recent years, research has shown that judicial selection methods
probably do impact judicial behavior, particularly on hot-button is-
sues. One problem with looking for these effects is finding ways of
measuring them. However, several studies have identified indicators
of these effects, often focusing on one of the most contentious aspects
of criminal justice-the death penalty. Professor Gerald Uelmen
found that judges in states relying on executive appointment were
most likely to overturn death sentences, while those in states using
contested elections were most likely to uphold such sentences. 179
Uelmen also found that the rate of affirmation increased sharply in
176. Since 2000, Republicans have dominated in elections for the Ohio Supreme Court, in two
cases winning open seats, and winning contested elections as incumbents. The only Democratic
incumbent to stand for reelection was Alice Resnick who won reelection in 2000.
177. See, e.g., Nicholas 0. Alozie, Distribution of Women and Minority Judges: The Effects of
Judicial Selection Methods, 71 Soc. Sci. Q. 315 (1990); Nicholas 0. Alozie, Selection Methods
and the Recruitment of Women to State Courts of Last Resort, 77 Soc. Sci. Q. 110 (1996); Burton
M. Atkins & Henry R. Glick, Formal Judicial Recruitment and State Supreme Court Decisions, 2
AM. POL. Q. 427 (1974); Bradley C. Canon, The Impact of Formal Selection Processes on the
Characteristics of Judges-Reconsidered, 6 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 579 (1972); Herbert Jacob, The
Effect of Institutional Differences in the Recruitment Process: The Case of State Judges, 13 J. Pun.
L. 104 (1964); Stuart S. Nagel, Comparing Elected and Appointed Judicial Systems (Sage Profes-
sional Paper in American Politics No. 04-001, 1973).
178. See DANIEL R. PINELLO, THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL-SELECTION METHOD ON STATE-SU-
PREME-COURT POLICY: INNOVATION, REACTION, AND ATROPHY (1995); Martin A. Levin, Ur-
ban Politics and Judicial Behavior, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 193 (1972).
179. Gerald F. Uelmen, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: Maintaining the Independence of State Su-
preme Courts in an Era of Judicial Politicization, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133, 1137 (1997).
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the decade following the defeat of the three California justices.18 0 In a
series of studies looking at state supreme court decisionmaking in
death penalty cases, Professors Hall and Paul Brace also found that
the method of judicial selection, and the proximity of elections for
judges subject to elections for retaining their seats, are related to deci-
sions in death penalty cases. 181
A recent paper on this topic by Professors Brace and Brent Boyea
demonstrates the impact of selection system in a clearer fashion.1 82
Brace and Boyea consider the combination of state-level public opin-
ion and selection system. Their hypothesis is that judges facing the
possibility of an opposing candidate in a bid for reelection will be in-
fluenced by the views on the death penalty held by the voters who
control their future service on the bench.'8 3 In contrast, they hypothe-
size little or no effect for judges subject to retention elections, reap-
pointment, or for those who serve until reaching a mandatory
retirement age. 184 Looking at states with appointive/retention selec-
tion systems, Brace and Boyea found that neither public opinion re-
garding the death penalty nor the question of whether a judge is
seeking reelection or reappointment influences decisions in death
penalty cases. 185 In sharp contrast, in states using either partisan or
nonpartisan elections, strong public support for the death penalty
reduces the likelihood that a justice will vote to reverse in a death
penalty case, while a justice who is retiring is more likely to reverse. 86
A more striking example of elected judges' concern about being
"soft" on death penalty cases comes from a study of "jury overrides"
by trial judges in capital cases in Alabama. Alabama is one of several
180. Id. at 1136. Uelmen also notes that, in addition to the well-known examples of the three
California justices and Penny White in Tennessee, two justices in Mississippi lost reelection bids
(at the primary election stage) in the wake of campaigns attacking them for decisions in death
penalty cases. Id. at 1136-37; see also David W. Case, In Search of an Independent Judiciary:
Alternatives to Judicial Elections in Mississippi, 13 Miss. C. L. REV. 1, 15-20 (1992).
181. Paul R. Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, The Interplay of Preferences, Case Facts, Context,
and Rules in the Politics of Judicial Choice, 59 J. POL. 1206 (1997); Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral
Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts, 54 J. POL. 427 (1992); Melinda Gann Hall,
Justices as Representatives: Elections and Judicial Politics in the American States, 23 AM. POL. Q.
485 (1995); Melinda Gann Hall & Paul Brace, The Vicissitudes of Death by Decree: Forces Influ-
encing Capital Punishment Decision Making in State Supreme Courts, 75 Soc. Sci. Q. 136 (1994);
Melinda Gann Hall & Paul Brace, Toward an Integrated Model of Judicial Voting Behavior, 20
AM. POL. Q. 147 (1992).
182. Paul Brace & Brent D. Boyea, State Public Opinion, the Death Penalty and the Practice
of Electing Judges (undated, unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
183. Id. at 7-8.
184. Id. at 8-9.
185. Id. at 20-22.
186. Id. at 22-23.
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death penalty states where trial judges may override a jury's recom-
mendation in a capital case regardless of whether that recommenda-
tion is for death or for imprisonment. 87 The original logic of giving
judges the power to override a jury's recommendation in capital cases
was to allow judges to mitigate the expected harshness of juries; it
appears that at least some of the states which allow judges life-to-
death overrides enacted them out of a misunderstanding of what the
Supreme Court required in Furman v. Georgia.188 However, we can
see the electoral linkage of such overrides in the timing of when Ala-
bama's judges choose to impose the death penalty rather than accept
the jury's recommendation of imprisonment. 189
Trial judges in Alabama serve six-year terms.190 If there was no
connection between a coming reelection and judges' decisions to over-
ride a jury's recommendation of imprisonment, one would expect that
overrides would be randomly distributed across judges' time in office.
However, if judges are concerned that appearing soft on the death
penalty might make them vulnerable to an electoral challenge, one
might expect the overrides to be more common in the two years prior
to a judge standing for reelection. Between Alabama's adoption of
jury overrides and 1998, there were 63 cases in which a judge imposed
the death penalty after the jury recommended imprisonment.' 91 If
there were no connection to the electoral cycle, one would expect an
average of just over 10 per year (10.2 to be exact). Table 1 shows the
expected distribution and the observed actual distribution. Overrides
appear to be more likely as election nears; in fact the probability that
the pattern shown in Table 1 could have been produced by a random
process is only 0.074.192
187. See Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding
Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 766 (1995)
(citing Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 516 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
188. 408 U.S. 238 (1972); see also Michael L. Radelet & Michael Mello, Death-to-Life Over-
rides: Saving the Resources of the Florida Supreme Court, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 195, 197 (1992).
189. In fact, Alabama judges are much more likely to override a recommendation of impris-
onment than a recommendation of death. Through 1994 or 1995, Alabama judges had rejected a
recommendation of death in only 5 cases while rejecting a recommendation of imprisonment in
47 cases. See Harris, 513 U.S. at 513. Similarly, between 1972 and 1992, Florida judges had
rejected death recommendations 51 times while rejecting life imprisonment recommendations
134 times. See Radelet & Mello, supra note 188, at 196, 210. Equally important is that at the
time of Harris, Alabama appellate courts had never reversed a judge's decision imposing death
over the recommendation of the jury. See Fred B. Burnside, Comment, Dying to Get Elected: A
Challenge to the Jury Override, 1999 Wis. L. REV. 1017, 1024.
190. At.A. CONST. art. VI, § 154(a).
191. Burnside, supra note 189, at 1041.
192. Id.
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TABLE 1: DEATH PENALTY OVERRIDES IN ALABAMA 1 9 3
Months Until Expected Number Observed Number
Election of Overrides of Overrides
1-12 10.3 18
13-24 10.3 9
25-36 10.3 6
37-48 10.3 12
49-60 10.3 12
61-72 10.3 6
Table 2 refines the analysis by splitting the data before and after the
1986 election in which Justice Bird and two of her colleagues in Cali-
fornia were defeated in a retention election, largely because they
overturned death sentences appealed to the California Supreme
Court.' 94 There was no discernable pattern prior to the Bird election,
but a clear pattern emerged afterward; the chance that the after pe-
riod pattern could have been produced by a random process is only
0.015.195 It appears that the election in California had the effect of
putting Alabama trial judges on notice that being perceived as soft on
the death penalty could lead to electoral challenge and defeat. 196
IV. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have focused on issues of independence and ac-
countability, with a particular eye to the role of elections in choosing
and retaining American judges. The inevitable tension between inde-
pendence and accountability is one of the fundamental dilemmas of
what we call the rule of law. The ideal of the rule of law calls for
judges to look only to the law when making their decisions. That as-
sumes, of course, that the law is reasonably clear. If the law is not
clear, the influences on judges must extend beyond the law itself;
those influences can include the judges' own beliefs and preferences
and the judges' perception of the beliefs and preferences of the people
they serve.
193. Id.
194. See Culver & Wold, supra note 93, at 87-88.
195. Burnside, supra note 189, at 1041.
196. A study of sentencing in noncapital cases provides evidence that judges' sentencing deci-
sions in lesser cases is also influenced by the election cycle, with judges imposing harsher
sentences as the time for their reelection nears. See Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon,
Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind When It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. Sci. 247,
261 (2004).
[Vol. 56:423
2007] LAW AS A MERE CONTINUATION OF POLITICS 465
TABLE 2: DEATH PENALTY OVERRIDES IN ALABAMA BEFORE AND
AFTER THE 1986 ROSE BIRD ELECTION' 9 7
Months Before Rose Bird Election After Rose Bird Election
Until Expected Observed Expected ObservedNumber of Number of Number of Number ofOverrides Overrides Overrides Overrides
1-12 3.16 3 7.33 15
13-24 3.16 3 7.33 6
25-36 3.16 4 7.33 2
37-48 3.16 3 7.33 9
49-60 3.16 4 7.33 8
61-72 3.16 2 7.33 4
However, the dilemmas of judicial selection extend beyond the
trade-off between accountability and independence that is so funda-
mental to our notions of the rule of law. When we select judges, we
want the process to have transparency, we want the judges chosen on
the basis of merit, and we want a judiciary that reflects the diversity of
the citizenry. 198 These factors are important for our view of the legiti-
macy of the courts. If we have significant doubts about the qualifica-
tions and ability of our judges, if groups are effectively excluded from
judicial service, and if we believe that judges have been selected in
ways that serve specific interests and systematically exclude others,
our trust and faith in the courts is undermined.
Are there other ways we could select judges that would improve
upon the systems now in place? The answer to that depends upon
what one means by "improve." We can certainly choose systems that
alter the balance between independence and accountability. We can
also alter how we take merit and transparency into consideration. Im-
agine the following system. A nominating commission is selected
through a process that combines traditionally political and nonpoliti-
cal elements. For example, the ten-person commission might consist
of two people selected by the governor of a state, one person selected
by the speaker of the lower house of the state legislature, one person
selected by the current chief justice, one person selected by the presi-
dent of the state bar association, two law school deans chosen by lot,
and three laypersons chosen by the other members of the commission.
197. Burnside, supra note 189, at 1041.
198. See Franqois du Bois, Judicial Selection in Post-Apartheid South Africa, in APPOINTING
JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 6, at 280, 291-95; Kate Malleson, Introduc-
tion, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 6, at 3. 7-9; Paterson,
supra note 6, at 14.
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The commission could be given a staff to assist in the review of candi-
dates who apply for, or are nominated for, judicial vacancies. For a
given vacancy, the commission sends a single name to the appointing
authority (presumably the governor) who may appoint the nominee,
ask the commission to reconsider the nominee, or reject the nominee.
In the latter two situations, the appointing authority must explain the
reason for requesting reconsideration or for rejecting the nominee. If
the appointing authority rejects the nominee, the commission then
forwards a new nominee whom the appointing authority is obligated
to appoint.
The nominating commission also serves as a review and assessment
commission for sitting judges. At the beginning of the last year of a
judge's term, the commission undertakes an assessment of the judge's
performance. If eight or more members of the commission believe
the judge should continue in office, the judge's appointment is re-
newed; if less than eight vote for renewal, the judge must stand in a
retention election before the electorate.
Is this system nonpolitical? Of course not, but the politics are quite
different from what we now see in the United States. The initial selec-
tion process resembles the method currently used in Scotland' 99 and
England2°° (although in England it has only recently gone into opera-
tion). The politics come into play in determining who actually gets
appointed to the commission, in what role is played by the staff of the
commission, in whom the commission consults in assessing candidates,
and in how the commission chooses to weigh various criteria in mak-
ing both initial nominations and in doing the periodic evaluations.
The system is not nonpolitical; it is simply differently political. In the
minds of some people, such a system would be better than any of the
systems now operating in the United States; in the minds of others, it
would be deemed worse.
I would be surprised if a system such as the one I have described
would be adopted in the near future. Elections will continue to play a
major role in our selection and retention of judges. The question then
becomes whether we want elections to be meaningful or to play
largely symbolic roles in giving the citizenry the impression they have
a say in who sits on the benches of our courts. If the public wants to
have a significant say, then the best avenue is to reintroduce partisan-
ship in some way. That could mean partisan elections. It could mean
199. See Judicial Appointments Board for Scotland, http://www.judicialappointmentsscotland
.gov.uk/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2007).
200. See Constitutional Reform Act 2005, ch. 4, § 27, available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/
acts2005/50004-d.htm#27.
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welcoming parties into the campaign process in nonpartisan elections
even while requiring judges to run without partisan identification on
the ballot. Or, it could mean inviting parties to create committees or
commissions to assess judges standing for retention.
Selecting and retaining government officials, including judges, is
fundamentally a political process. That process can be internally po-
litical as is the case in bureaucratically organized judiciaries, °2 0 it can
include public officials who are directly answerable to the electorate,
or it can involve the electorate itself. How politics plays out in the
selection system depends on the structure of that system. How the
selection system balances accountability, independence, merit, diver-
sity, and transparency also depends on the specific system. We must
make choices. We cannot avoid politics.
201. For discussions of the Japanese judiciary which is bureaucratically organized, see J.
MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC B. RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE POLITI-
CAL ECONOMY OF JUDGING IN JAPAN (2003); John 0. Haley, The Japanese Judiciary: Maintain-
ing Integrity, Autonomy and the Public Trust, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT (Daniel J.
Foote ed., forthcoming 2007), available at http://law.wustl.edu/uploadedFiles/Faculty/Haley/The
JapaneseJudiciarySSRN.pdf; Masaki Abe, The Internal Control of a Bureaucratic Judiciary:
The Case of Japan, 23 INT'L J. Soc. L. 303 (1995); Frank K. Upham, Political Lackeys or Faithful
Public Servants? Two Views of the Japanese Judiciary, 30 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 421 (2005).
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